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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The educational reforms implemented by the Department of Education during the last decade
have resulted in a number of high profile public university mergers taking place in South
Africa. The private higher education sector has simultaneously been significantly restructured
by new educational legislation, to such an extent that a numerous private providers have been
forced to cease operations due to the onerous requirements of the new laws.
In this context, private higher education institutions are increasingly being compelled to
consider alternative strategic options in order to continue to operate as viable entities. This
study examined two private theological higher education institutions operating in
Pietennaritzburg, South Africa, and considered whether a merger of the two organisations
would be advantageous in light ofthe pressures being faced by the institutions. The objectives
of the study were to assess first, whether a merger of the two institutions would be feasible
and second, whether it would be desirable.
The study reviewed the literature relating to various fonns of organisational co-operation ,
focusing particularly on mergers. The benefits associated with mergers were highlighted as
well as the major causes of the extraordinarily high merger failure rate experienced in
practice. The tendency of leaders of merging entities to overlook cultural and people issues
when planning and implementing a merger was noted. Attention was given to the managerial
approaches necessary to reduce the risk of merger failure. Factors specific to mergers within
the non-profit and educational sectors were considered, focusing on structural options for
multi-campus educational institutions in particular.
The methodology used to address the research objectives called for the conducting of
structured interviews with a sample of employees and Board or Council members from both
institutions, as well as an examination of various institutional records. Employees of both
institutions completed a simple questionnaire designed to provide data for an analysis of the
respective organisational cultures of the two institutions.
The findings of the study suggested that a merger between the institutions would be feasible,
but that employees of the two organisations are not generally of the view that a merger would
be desirable in the short term.
There was however more support in principle for a merger in the medium to long term and the
study consequently recommends that a joint task team be established to prepare a roadmap for
the ultimate merger of the two institutions. In the short term it is recommended that a joint
venture or strategic alliance be entered into by the two organisations primarily in order to test
the compatibility of the two organisational cultures.
Further recommendations cover issues such as the ideal structure for the merged entity and




I, Michael John Bishop, hereby declare that the contents of this dissertation are my own work,
and that all sources utilised have been accurately reported and acknowledged . This
dissertation has not, nor will be submitted for any other degree / examination at any
university.
Signed: Date: 26 September 2006
111
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to the following people without whose contributions this study would not have
been possible:
To Professor Debbie Vigar-Ellis who supervised this project, thank you for your
encouragement, patience and meticulous attention to detail;
To Overseas Council International and the anonymous donors who provided the resources to
meet the costs of this degree: I am humbled by your gift and encouraged by your concern for
the development of theological education in Africa. Thank you.
To the staff, Council and Board members of the Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa and
the Union Bible Institute : I have appreciated your interest and enthusiastic participation in this
study and I applaud your dedicated service to God and your students in circumstances that too
often fall well short of ideal.
To my wife, Kym, thank you for your encouragement, for lightening my load and loving me






1.3. Outline of the study 3
2. MERGER THEORY 4
2.1. Organisational co-operation short of full amalgamation 4
2.1.1 Joint ventures 4
2. 1.2 Strategic alliances 5
2.2. Mergers 5
2.2.1 Reasons for considering a merger 7
2.2.2 Causes of merger failure 9
2.2.3 Managing the risk of merger failure 15
2.3. Conclusion 24
3. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED MERGER 26
3.1. Factors particular to non-profit organisations 26
3.2. Mergers in Higher Education 27
3.2.1 Cultural integration in Higher Education mergers 27
3.2.2 Managing the human resource in Higher Education mergers 27
3.2.3 Multi-campus factors and structural options 28
3.2.4 Private higher education institutions in post-I 994 South Africa 32
3.2.5 The Pietermaritzburg context 35
3.3. Institutional backgrounds 35
3.3.1 The Union Bible Institute 35
3.3.2 The Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa 37
3.4. Conclusion 38
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 39
4.1. Research objectives 39
4.2. Research design 39
4.2.1 Merger feasibility 39
4.2.2 Merger desirability 44
4.3. Research limitations 44
5. FINDINGS 46
5.1. Merger feasibility 46
5.1.1 Financial 46
5.1.2 Academic programmes 49
5.1.3 Human Resources 50
5.1.4 Student communities 53
5.1.5 Strategic Fit 54
5.1.6 Stakeholders 56
5.1.7 Logistics 57
5.1.8 Legal implications 58
5.1.9 Cultural compatibility 58
5.2. Merger desirability 60
5.2.1 Board perspective 60
5.2.2 Staff perspectives 60
5.3. Conclusion 61
6. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 62
6.1. Merger Feasibility 62
6.1.1 The impact of the nature of the proposed merger on its feasibil ity 62
6.1.2 Likel y benefits of an ESSA / UBI merger 63
6.1.3 Potential obst acles to a successful ESSA / UBI merger 64
6.1.4 Cultural compatibility 65
6. 1.5 Curricular compatibi lity 66
6.1.6 Strategic fit 66
6.1.7 Legal issues 67
6.1.8 Financial viability 68
6.1 .9 Human Resources 69
6.1.10 Campus cultures 69
6.1.11 Operations issues 69
6.1.12 Stakeholder compatibility 70




8.1. Join t task team 73
8.2. Critical proces s issues 73
8.2.1 Addressing staff concerns 73
8.2.2 Stakeholder consultation 74
8.2.3 Identifying risk and success factors 74
8.2.4 Speed of implementation 74
8.3. Designing the roadmap 74
8.3.1 Organisati onal Structure 74
8.3.2 Organi sational mission 75
8.3.3 Organisational name 75
8.3.4 Managing cultural integration 76
8.4. Conclusion 76
9. FUTURE RESEARCH 77
10. REFERENCES 78
APPENDIX A - ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE SURVEy 82
APPENDIX B - SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 84
APPENDIX C - FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 85
APPENDIX D - GUIDED INTERVIEW OUTLINE 98
APPENDIX E - CAMPUS FACILITIES 99
APPENDIX F - ACADEMIC CURRICULA 100
APPENDIX G - INFORMED CONSENT FORM 102
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1 Value capture following a merger 13
Figure 2-2 Most common problems identified in post-merger integration 16
Figure 2-3 Relationship between culture types and individual constraint levels 20
Figure 3-1 Confederal structure 30
Figure 3-2 Federal structure 31
Figure 3-3 Unitary structure 31
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1 Similarities between Bert et al and KPMG's merger success factors 17
Table 3-1 Programmes submitted to the CHE by discipline 2002 33
Table 3-2 Re-accreditation outcomes of institutions and programmes 2002 34
Table 3-3 Programme accreditation success rate 2003-2004 34
Table 5-1 Selected financial ratios for the past three financial years 47
Table 5-2 Student numbers 2004-2006 48
Table 5-3 Student tuition fees: Comparative costs 49
Table 5-4 Comparison of staff profiles 50
Table 5-5 Classification of ESSA students by country of origin and race group 53
Table 5-6 Profile of staff who completed questionnaires 59
Table 5-7 Results of organisational culture survey 59
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
South Africa has witnessed a spate of public tertiary education mergers in the first part of the
twenty-first century. The South African government has justified these hugely disruptive
organisational restructuring efforts on the basis of the need to rationalise the provision of
tertiary education, thereby better utilising public resources. The Department of Education's
third white paper observes that:
Many [public] institutions either require consolidation or retooling for new
missions and goals. Narrow self-interest cannot be allowed to preclude
planning which may lead to institutional mergers and closures (1997:19)
At the same time, the dramatic increase in government intervention in private higher
education, particularly as embodied in the provisions of the Higher Education Act 101 of
1997, has increased pressures on independent institutions and forced the closure of a number
of private providers (Council on Higher Education, 2003:50).
Given the scarcity of resources for non-profit entities and in light of the increasing complexity
of operating within the new legislative framework, it seems clear that strategy-makers in such
institutions need to give serious consideration to some form of co-operation with other similar
organisations in order to reap comparable benefits to those being pursued by the public
tertiary institutions.
This study considers two private theological institutions both located in Pietermaritzburg,
South Africa. While the history of the two entities has overlapped from time to time, the
Union Bible Institute (UBI) and the Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa (ESSA) have
not co-operated to any significant degree with one another during the years of their existence.
This study examines various forms of organisational co-operation that may be available to the
two institutions, concentrating specifically on the feasibility and desirability of a full merger.
Both institutions have welcomed the study, and its timing is fortuitous, with preliminary
discussions already having taken place between the senior leadership teams around the topic
of a potential merger. On 22 May 2006, a meeting attended by Principals and Board and
Council members from UBI and ESSA and an interested third party, the Durban Bible
College (OBe), recognised the need for increased co-operation between the institutions and
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stated the meeting's preference for a full merger. At present, no formal decisions have been
taken, but a commitment has been made to continue investigating the merits of such a merger.
The interest of OBC in this process has been noted and certainly calls for further
investigation. The scope of this study however only extends to the feasibility and desirability
of a merger between UBI and ESSA.
1.2. Objectives
The objective of this study was to consider the feasibility and desirability of a merger between
ESSA and UBI. The feasibility of such a merger was assessed in terms of the following
factors:
• Financial feasibility ;
• Cumicular compatibility;
• Human Resources and organisational culture issues;
• Student body factors;




In order to address the question of merger feasibility, a range of records and constitutional
documentation from both institutions were examined (as well as relevant legal documents
from external sources) and a sample of twenty individuals interviewed from among the staff
and governing board or council of each institution. Twenty four staff members also completed
a questionnaire designed to assess the cultural compatibility of the two institutions.
The desirability of a merger between ESSA and UBI was assessed through structured
interviews conducted with the same sample of twenty staff and board members.
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1.3. Outline of the study
The study begins with an examination of other forms of inter-organisational co-operation
which stop short of a full merger, namely strategic alliances and joint ventures. More focused
attention is then given to the literature relating to mergers , dealing in particular with the
general rationale for considering a merger. The high failure rate of mergers in practice is
acknowledged and factors to which this can be attributed are considered.
Given the risks of merger failure, consideration is then given to how these risks can be
managed by organisational leaders and in particular how the often-neglected personnel and
corporate culture issues can be effectively handled in the course of a merger.
The specific context of the proposed merger is thereafter considered, with attention given to
the non-profit, higher education sector within South Africa , as well as a closer examination of
the immediate contexts (both historical and current) within which the two institutions have
operated.
The methodology chapter of the study examines the research objectives in more detail and
outlines and justifies the methodology chosen to address the research problem. The
instrument designed to assess cultural compatibility is described at this point. The results of
the data collection process are then set out in the findings chapter, with the information
organised around the broad themes of merger feasibility and desirability.
A separate chapter analyses the findings of the data collection process in the light of the
theory which has been discussed in the earlier chapters of the study. Ultimately a finding is
made on the feasibility and desirability of a merger. A potential merger process is then
considered and forms part of the recommendations to the respective management teams.
3
2. MERGER THEORY
This chapter briefly considers various forms of co-operation that may be adopted between
organisations. Of the three alternatives considered, particular attention is given in this study to
the theory relating to mergers. The chapter addresses the incentives for implementing a
merger and highlights the most common causes of merger failure. Attention is given to how
the risks of merger failure can be managed by organisational leaders, with particular focus on
people and culture-related issues in a merger.
2.1. Organisational co-operation short of full amalgamation
A full merger between two entities involves considerable risk, as is evidenced by the
extremely high merger failure rate observed in practice (See 2.2.2 below). Organisations
pursuing the potential benefits (See 2.2.1 below) offered by co-operating with another entity,
but which are averse to the risks of a full amalgamation, should consider other forms of co-
operation. Two such alternatives, which involve significant co-operation between entities, but
which stop well short of a full merger, are joint ventures and strategic alliances.
2.1.1 Joint ventures
A joint venture may be described as the co-operation of two or more entities, which share
certain assets with a view to achieving a specific business objective (Gaughan, 2005:319).
While a merger consists of a complete amalgamation between two entities, a joint venture is
limited in the sense that it only involves a defined portion of the resources of each
participating entity, and usually will only exist for a fixed period of time. Gaughan observes
that typically a joint venture will involve the establishment of a new entity, separate from
either of the Principals, and will be governed by a formal agreement between the two
compames.
Gaughan notes that a joint venture may be the ideal means of assessing the potential for a
merger between two organisations. A limited project may uncover issues of cultural
incompatibility in particular (See Cartwright and Cooper, 1996: 100 for a discussion of the
complexities of cross-border co-operation and the attendant cultural challenges) and may
consequently provide a significantly less costly means of testing the relationship than a failed
merger (Gaughan, 2005:320).
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Gaughan however notes that joint ventures are not "a cure for all the ills of Mergers and
Acquisitions" as they bring with them their own problems. Specifically, clashes of corporate
culture, an unwillingness to share valuable intellectual property and a lack of commitment to
the venture are all potential sources of a failure of this type of arrangement (Gaughan,
2005:326).
2.1.2 Strategic alliances
By comparison with joint ventures, strategic alliances tend to be more informal, generally not
involving the creation of a new entity (Gaughan, 2005:326). Strategic alliances are usually
motivated by factors such as the desire to access new markets, utilise new technology or share
risk (Elmuti and Kathawala, 2001:206).
Hackett (1996:8) observes that strategic alliances are more likely to be used in environments
where there is a great deal of diversity and turbulence and a correspondingly high lack of
specialist skills in particular areas within both alliance partners. By contrast, joint ventures
will also tend to take place in volatile environments, but generally where there are not
significant skills shortages in the two parties .
Gaughan identifies a much greater potential for conflict between parties to a joint venture or
strategic alliance than is the case in a merger. He argues that this is due in the main to the
independence of the two entities and their separate respective corporate strategies. He
acknowledges that conflict will also exist within a merger, but that in such a case, it will be
internal and capable of resolution within the parameters of a single corporate strategy. One
suggestion offered by Gaughan as 'conflict insurance' is the purchase of shares in the other
entity or entities by each of the participants in the strategic alliance or joint venture (Gaughan,
2005:332).
2.2. Mergers
The central focus of this study is a potential merger and the theory relating to full mergers
will therefore be dealt with in considerably more detail than that of joint ventures or strategic
alliances.
Gaughan defines a merger as "a combination of two corporations m which only one
corporation survives" (2005:3). He notes that typically this takes place where a larger
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corporation acquires a smaller, target entity, but that it is also possible for similar sized
companies to merge and form an entirely new entity'.
Shraeder and Self (2003:511) distinguish between an acquisition, where one firm is consumed
by the other, and a merger, which involves the creation of a new consolidated entity from the
original two organisations .
Three broad types of mergers are generally recognized in the literature:
1. A vertical merger takes place when two or more entities from consecutive supply
chain stages within the same industry come together to form a single organisation.
Gaughan observes that this type of merger occurs whenever companies with a buyer-
seller relationship merge (2005:5), while Cartwright and Cooper (1996:3) describe
such a union as "the combination of two organizations from successive processes
within the same industry".
2. A horizontal merger takes place between two competitors - organisations competing
in the same industry and at the same level in the supply chain (Gaughan, 2005:4).
3. An organisation acquiring another company which operates in different industry,
whether or not at the same level (i.e. manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer) is engaging in
a conglomerate merger (Gaughan, 2005:6).
3.(a) A special case of conglomerate merger is termed a congeneric merger by
Botha (2001:275) where the two companies operate in the same general
industry, but are not direct competitors and are not in a buyer-seller
relationship with each other.
3.(b) A further special type of conglomerate merger referred to as a concentric
merger involves two organisations in different industries, where the two
industries are related in some way. Botha (2001:275) defines a concentric
merger as one taking place between two entities sharing similar production or
distribution technologies.
He cites the example of the merger between Burroughs and Sperry in 1986 to form UNISYS.
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Cartwright and Cooper (1996:3) and Botha (2001:275) classify the concentric category as a
fourth merger type and Botha classifies the congeneric type as a fifth category.
The classification of merger types is useful for more than the theoretical framework that it
establishes. Porter (1987 :41) has shown that the different types of mergers carry
correspondingly different levels of risk ofmerger failure (See 2.2.2.1.1 below).
Having dealt with the general definition and classification of mergers , the rationale for
embarking on a corporate merger is now considered. The sections which follow deal with the
benefits and risks of organisational mergers.
2.2.1 Reasons for considering a merger
This study has already alluded to the risks involved in pursuing a merger. In light of this, the
potential gains which entice organisations to assume these risks are worthy of careful
examination.
There are a number of benefits to be had from the merger of two entities , which can be
classified as either financial (with a view to increasing shareholder wealth) or strategic (for
example, to increase market share) . Botha (2001 :275) refers to the ' traditional' distinction
between financial and strategic mergers , noting that in addition, a more recent motive for
merging is the ' j oining of diverse organisational cultures". He then proceeds to cite several
strategic reasons for diversification being desirable (such as the penetration of new markets or
the introduction of new products). For this reason the ' traditional distinction' between
financial and strategic mergers is preferred in this study (see also Cartwright and Cooper,
1996:20).
Essentially, the advantages of a merger can all be described as synergistic - where the results
of the merger in a specific area exceed the sum of the individual efforts of each constituent
organisation, whether in the area of costs, revenue, skills or market share (Gaughan, 2005:56).
De Camara and Renjen (2004:10) assert that "successful mergers start with a clear
understanding of the synergies they hope to capture". Therefore, if two organisations
exploring the possibility of merging are not able to identify synergies likely to result from the
merger, it is probable that there are not sufficient grounds for proceeding with the union.




The merger of two organisations may result in a reduction of the unit costs of manufacture or
equivalent scale cost benefits in a service industry. This is particularly true in the case of
horizontal mergers (Correia et ai, 2005:17.2) and may be brought about in the merged entity
by:
• its increased production output;
• its greater buying power;
• a reduction in the number of retail or service outlets necessary;
• tax advantages;
• the consolidation of its administrative and other support functions.
All other things being equal, the effect of operating economies resulting from a merger will be
an increase in shareholder wealth (Correia et ai, 2005: 17.3).
2.2.1.2 (;rolVth
De Camara and Renjen (2004: 10) note that, although cost savings will typically be a key
benefit of a successful merger, usually the motivation for a merger is the greater ability to
generate revenue and seize market share.
Gaughan (2005:42) cautions that embarking on a merger for the sake of growth per se is not
always appropriate. He observes that although production may increase in a merged entity, it
is possible that the new organisation may be less profitable at the increased level of output,
with the result that shareholders suffer. Gaughan however does recognise that the use of
mergers to grow an organisation is an appropriate strategy first, where shareholders benefit
from the transaction and second, in slow-growth industries, where the riskier growth-by-
acquisition strategy may be preferable to the slower organic growth alternative. In addition,
there is a place for organisational size being a valid strategic end in itself, particularly where it
affords a dominant company in an industry a competitive advantage over its rivals merely by
virtue of its size (Gaughan 2005:51).
While Gaughan describes situations where the pursuit of a growth strategy is appropriate,
Cartwright and Cooper (1996:21) warn that there is the potential for senior management to
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pursue growth strategies for reasons other than the best interests of the shareholders as there is
often a correlation between organisational size and executive compensation.
2.2.1.3 Improved management
Large companies possessing sufficient skilled management resources are able to add
significant value to smaller, target entities which lack specialised skilled personnel
(Damodaran, 2001:841). In the case of two small entities merging, the consolidation of human
resources may give rise to the opportunity for skilled staff to be allowed to specialise to a
greater extent than previously possible in a smaller organisation (Correia et al, 2005:17.3).
2.2.1.4 Greater market power
The effect of a merger between competitors could result in a weakening of competitive forces,
which in turn may allow the new entity to increase its prices without adversely affecting its
market share or profitability (Correia et al, 2005:17.3). Thompson and Strickland observe that
"as a rule, the stronger the collective impact of competitive forces, the lower the combined
profitability of participant firms" (2003:92). Conversely, it can be concluded that where a
merger results in a weakening of competitive forces, firms may anticipate the possibility of
increased profitability.
Thompson and Strickland in their discussion of strategies within a maturing industry note that
as competitive forces increase, "stiffening competition induces a number of mergers and
acquisitions among former competitors, drives the weakest firms out of the industry, and
produces industry consolidation in general" (2003:266). The combination of the pressures of
industry competitive forces and the lure of the potential benefits of a merger appear to make
an appealing case for organisations considering a merger.
2.2.2 Causes of merger failure
While a compelling argument can be made for the implementation of a merger (particularly in
a mature or maturing market, where competitive forces are strong) there are a number of
factors which suggest that organisations should approach this decision very cautiously. The
major disincentive to pursue a merger is the extraordinarily high rate of failure recorded in
practice. Many writers have noted that the overwhelming majority of corporate mergers
undertaken tend to fail (Nguyen and Kleiner, 2003:447, Correia et al, 2005:17.6, Cartwright
and Cooper, 1996:5, KPMG, 1999), however
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curiously, widespread merger failure is at odds with the public and media
perceptions that mergers are grand things that are almost sure to create
enormous business synergies that are good for employees, stockholders, and
consumers. (Weber and Camerer, 2003:400)
To illustrate their point, Weber and Camerer consider among others, the case of
DaimlerChrysler where the two companies performed considerably better prior to their
merger, the failure in that instance being attributed largely to a clash of corporate cultures.
Nguyen and Kleiner (2003:447) identify poor planning and poor implementation as the two
major categories of factors leading to merger failures. Their broad classification will be used
in examining the various factors to which merger failure can be attributed.
2.2.2.1 Poor planning
The success of the merger between Compaq and Hullett-Packard is, in part, attributable to the
excellence of its planning. Managers working on the merger (in a small, dedicated "clean
team" comprising senior staff from both entities) produced a detailed roadmap covering issues
such as the organisational structure, product line , key management appointments, business
processes and IT systems of the new organisation. This roadmap was produced long before
the details of the merger deal had even been finalised (de Camara and Renjen 2004: 11).
However, critical as detailed planning of the implementation of the merger may be, there is
the potential for poor decision-making in the very earliest stages of merger discussions to
wreck the entire venture, particularly the following two basic decisions (Bijlsma-Frankema,
2001: 197 and Damodaran, 2001 :837):
2.2.2.1.1. Choice of the right merger partner
Managers considering a merger need to be mindful of the extent to which their choice of
merger partner (or target entity as the case may be) is influenced by the potential for genuine
benefit arising out of the merger (as discussed in 2.2.1 above) such as:
• genuine opportunities for synergy (see 2.2 above, De Camara and Renjen, 2004: 10);
• the possibility of enhancing performance through improved management (see 2.2.1.3
above, Damodaran, 2001 :841);
• the strategic benefit of growth by acquisition (see 2.2.1.2 above, Gaughan, 2005:42);
or
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• hubris (unfounded optimism) or management pride or self-interest (see 2.2.1.2 above,
Cartwright and Cooper, 1996:21).
The possibility of poorly motivated management decisions is explored by Richard Roll's
'hubris hypothesis '. He argues that "managers engage in [mergers and acquisitions] for their
own personal reasons and that this is their primary motive, and the economic gains of the
company ... are secondary to this personal motive" and supports his theory with an
impressive body of research (Gaughan, 2005:77).
In addition to the motivation for the choice of a partner or target, it is critical that attention be
given to the type of merger (see 2.2 above) which would result from the amalgamation. Porter
(1987:41) in his research, demonstrates a relationship between the extent to which the
acquired company is in a related industry and the percentage of acquisitions subsequently
divested by conglomerate companies. Porter found that the more tenuous the link between the
industries in which two merging companies operate, the more likely that the merger will fail.
This principle can be restated by observing that mergers within the same industry are more
likely to succeed than those in unrelated industries (i.e. horizontal or vertical mergers are a
lower risk option than conglomerate mergers).
Bijlsma-Frankema (2001:197) stresses the importance of choosing the right merger partner
from a corporate culture perspective. She advocates thorough 'partner analysis' , paying
particular attention to the goals and aspirations of each organisation as a helpful indicator of
the respective cultures of each entity. Cartwright and Cooper affirm the importance of this
type of investigative planning, noting that "cultural fit is as necessary ... as strategic fit"
(1995:39).
2.2.2.1.2. The purchase price of the target entity
Damodaran (2001:837) notes that the winners in any acquisition are invariably the
shareholders of the target entity due to the fact that share prices are typically raised above
their real value by the prospect of a merger (see also Correia, 2005:17.6, Gaughan, 2005:77).
Acquiring companies also need to be wary of being caught in a bidder's war and eventually
paying far too much for the target entity - what Gaughan (2005:79) refers to as the 'winner's
curse' .
The choice of a merger partner and (in the case of an acquisition) the purchase price of the
target entity are both potentially make-or-break decisions in the early stages of merger
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planning. Once the initial decisions have been made, and even after the process has been
planned, however, the risk of failure still remains high as the process enters the critical
implementation stage (Nguyen and Kleiner, 2003:447).
2.2.2.2 Poor implementation
Nguyen and Kleiner maintain that the point at which merger failure is most likely to take
place is during the integration process, due to "improper managing and strategy, culture
differences, delays in communication , and [a] lack of clear vision" (2003:447). In addressing
the potential for mergers to fail due to poor implementation, the material will be considered in
three sections: the impact of the failure of senior management to provide leadership, the
consequences of a slow implementation process and the results of attempting to join
incompatible cultures.
2.2.2.2.1. Leadership failure by top management
There is a risk of merger failure where top management is guilty of leaving the task of
implementation to middle managers once the details of the merger have been settled, when
senior leadership should instead be focused on "the relentless identification and capture of
value" (Nguyen and Kleiner, 2003:448). By contrast, and by way of illustration, the HP -
Compaq merger received ongoing support from both CEO's and full-time attention from the
CFO of Compaq and HP's Head of Sales and Marketing (de Camara and Renjen, 2004:12).
Nguyen and Kleiner insist that directors need to "get out of the boardroom" (2003:450) and
they cannot simply delegate the critical task of merger implementation to middle managers
who may not have sufficient ability or authority to successfully carry out their appointed task.
Nguyen and Kleiner describe a merger or acquisition as "probably the biggest challenge [an]
organisation faces" (2003:448). If this is the case for a multinational giant acquiring another
company, the merger of two small entities is likely to have a far greater impact on the future
of the two organisations, making the ongoing involvement of senior management in such
circumstances absolutely vital.
2.2.2.2.2. Speed of implementation
Merger practitioners de Camara and Renjen (2004:11) stress the importance of ensuring that
the implementation of the merger takes place quickly. They acknowledge the critical nature of
a thorough and well-executed implementation, but insist that speed in itself is equally vital.
The authors cite the case of the successful HP-Compaq merger, where speedy implementation
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was illustrated by the use of an "adopt-and-go" philosophy whereby the merger team would
compare the approaches of the two companies to any particular task, decide which method
was superior, and then adopt it for the new company, rather than attempting the time-
consuming challenge of producing a hybrid method from the two previous approaches.
Bert et al argue that the implementation of a merger deal must be finalized within two years if
it is likely to succeed. They cite studies by A.T. Kearney which suggest that
after year two, the window of opportunity for forging merger synergies has
all but closed. ... When integration takes longer than two years, there is a
distinct, quantifiable loss (Bert et al2003 :42-43).
Figure 2-1 below demonstrates that of the gains to be made from a merger 85% of them are
reaped within the first year after the merger, with 15% in the second year and no further value
added after two years.






Year I Year 2
Source: Bert et ai, 2003:43
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2.2.2.3 The challenge of merging two corporate cultures
Cartwright and Cooper (1995:33) note that most mergers in the 1960's (predominantly in the
USA) were of the conglomerate type, however the recent wave of mergers have typically been
horizontal in nature. The effect of this is that, where previously the acquired company was
generally left relatively unaltered , modem mergers are requiring much higher levels of
integration between merger participants . Consequently, while conglomerate mergers tend to
generally only have a major impact at the level of senior management, horizontal mergers
require an integration of people, systems, policies and organisational cultures.
Weber and Camerer (2003:402) define corporate culture as "a general shared social
understanding, resulting in commonly held assumptions and views of the world among
organizational members", while Cartwright and Cooper (1996:61) describe it as "the way in
which things get done within an organisation". Nguyen and Kleiner (2003:449) suggest that
the potential clash of corporate cultures may be "the most dangerous factor when two
companies decide to combine" (emphasis added).
Weber and Camerer conducted a series of experiments to assess the impact of cultural conflict
issues on productivity in a post-merger company. They concluded (2003:412) first, that
cultural conflict does impact productivity and the likelihood of a successful merger and
second, that the influence of this factor is generally under-estimated by merger managers.
Bijlsma-Frankema (2001:192) identifies the critical impact of the clash of two corporate
cultures on the success or failure of a merger (see also Schraeder and Self, 2003:511). She
recognises the strong probability of some form of cultural clash within a merged organisation:
Since cultural adaptations mostly lag behind structural changes, there is a
high chance that a change in structure will bring about (temporary) frictions
between the (sub) cultures and the structure in the new organisation, that
foster unproductive behavioural reactions of organisational members and
groups, bringing about productivity losses. (2001:193)
Notwithstanding the seriousness of this task, Cartwright and Cooper (1995:35) report that the
general tendency of companies acquiring a target entity is to do a thorough financial and legal
assessment of the other company, but pay little or no attention to the personnel and cultural
implications of the merger. Cartwright and Cooper go on to suggest that the prioritisation of
'hard' (financial and legal) over 'soft' (culture and people) issues contributes towards the
typically high staff turnover rate in the years immediately following a merger.
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In view of the critical role of organisational culture in mergers, this issue is dealt with in more
detail below (2.2.3.2, page 17 below), focusing particularly on the kinds of interventions that
can be made by management in order to ensure that the clash of two distinct organisational
cultures does not derail a merger.
2.2.3 Managing the risk of merger failure
Although the possible benefits to be had from a merger are certainly attractive, organisational
leaders committing to an amalgamation must be able to manage the major problem areas
which typically arise if the risk of embarking on a merger is to be justified. This section
considers the type of approach that is called for from senior managers to reduce the risk of
merger failure.
A number of authors (see Covin et al, 1997:22; Cartwright and Cooper, 1995:35) have
commented on the predilection of prospective merger partners to focus on the 'hard' issues of
financial, legal and logistical viability and neglect the critically important questions relating to
people and culture. The first part of this section addresses general issues, both 'hard' and
'soft', while the remaining two sub-sections focus exclusively on the ' soft' questions.
2.2.3.1 Identifying and targeting critical areas
Bert et al, drawing on a global survey conducted by A.T. Keamey, illustrate the major causes
ofmerger failure in Figure 2-2 below:
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While it is clearly unlikely that a collection of key problem areas as illustrated in Figure 2-2
above will be normative for all mergers, the value of this type of data is that it provides the
basis for a list of priorities to be drawn up for the purposes of ongoing monitoring and
intervention from senior management during a merger process.
In addition to focusing on potential causes of failure, Bert et al (2003:44) and KPMG (1999)
list specific key steps or rules for successful mergers (See also Kerr, 1995:7 where the critical
importance of top management involvement and excellent communication were considered
responsible in the main for a successful merger between three British banks). The two lists
have much in common and are compared in Table 2-1 below:
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Table 2-1 Similarities between Bert et al and KPMG's merger success factors
BERTetal
Select leadership quickly
Establish clear goals and manage expectations
Build a strong integration structure
Establish open, frequent and timely
communications
Actively address cultural issues
Focus on customers explicitly
Rigorously manage risks
Source: Bert et al (2003:44) and KPMG (1999)
KPMG
Set direction for the new business
Provide clarity around roles and decision
lines
Focus on communication
Understand the emotional, political and
rational issues
Continue to focus on customers
Directors must get out of the boardroom
Maximise involvement
Be flexible.
Figure 2-2 and Table 2-1 therefore provide the basis for establishing a list of management
priorities during the planning and implementation of a merger and facilitate a proactive risk-
reducing approach from organisational leaders.
2.2.3.2 Managing the clash of organisational cultures
A merger will invariably involve, to a greater or lesser extent, a clash of two corporate
cultures which, as has already been noted, may be one of the major causes of merger failure
(Nguyen and Kleiner, 2003:449). It is however curious that Bert et al do not specifically cite
the clash of corporate cultures as a major cause of merger failure in Figure 2-2 above.
Nevertheless, if managers are able to understand the cultural dynamics involved, the process
can be carefully managed and the risk of culture-related failure reduced.
The two sub-sections which follow address firstly, the identification of different cultural types
and the likelihood of successful integration between various culture types (drawing on Cooper
and Cartwright's model) and secondly, the actual process of managing cultural integration
(relying on Bijlsma-Frankema's work).
2.2.3.2.1. Cartwright and Cooper's model
This section draws heavily on the work of Sue Cartwright and Cary Cooper of Manchester
University who have developed a model which claims a measure of predictive power for
assessing the likelihood of merger success in the light of the types of cultures being merged in
a given merger and the nature of the 'organisational marriage '.
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Cartwright and Cooper (1996:59) suggest that any given organisation has a distinct over-
arching culture of one particular type, notwithstanding the probability that there may be
several sub-cultures within that organisation. The existence of these multiple sub-cultures is
more likely in larger companies and not surprisingly, according to the authors, will tend to
complicate the merger of two organisational cultures .
Drawing on research published by Harrison in 1972, Cartwright and Cooper identify four
culture types, which they suggest (1996:65) "are easily recognised, have high face validity
and are considered meaningful by both managers and their employees":
1. Power cultures are common in small companies where a centralised power structure
is in place, comprising either an individual or a small group which exercises control of
the major decision-making processes within the organisation. Such cultures can
further be classified as either patriarchal (where the exercise of power is perceived by
employees to be for their benefit) or autocratic (where leaders are not perceived as
being concerned for the organisation or its employees). Because of the centralised
decision-making structure, change can be effected quickly within such an
organisation.
2. Role cultures are described as classically bureaucratic, with their organisations
focused on efficiency and viewing their employees in terms of their specific ,
predefined roles as opposed to their individual human personalities. Power is therefore
related to an employee 's role and their place in the organisational hierarchy. Such
organisations are often perceived as being impersonal and, compared to companies
with power cultures they tend to exhibit slower, more unwieldy decision-making
structures.
3. Task / achievement cultures are more common as sub-cultures within larger
organisations than as a dominant culture. Their central characteristic is their focus on
their key task, with the result that the outcome is more important in this culture than
any method or process. Workers are generally more autonomous and the exercise of
control over employees may be problematic due to the lack of formal authority
structures.
4. The person I support culture focuses on the nurture and development of its
members , with a relative disregard for structure and a strong concern for
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egalitarianism. Decision-making within such organisations is generally collective.
This type of culture is found almost exclusively in non-profit organisations.
Schraeder and Self (2003:513) observe that although a high degree of similarity between the
corporate cultures of prospective merger partners may intuitively seem to be ideal, "there is an
argument suggesting that some degree of disagreement on objectives can actually have a
positive effect on success expectations". Cartwright and Cooper (1996:76) note that the
' intuitive' model referred to by Self and Schraeder has no empirical backing and Bijlsma-
Frankema (2001:197) goes so far as to argue that
too much [cultural] fit can reduce the synergetic effects to be expected from
the melting process. It may not be worth the trouble merging with a firm
that, in the face of common problems, can add no substantial solutions to the
ones already available.
In any event, Cartwright and Cooper contend that mergers between cultures of different types
are likely to be more common than mergers between similar cultures as "in practice, financial
and strategic considerations are always likely to outweigh any selection criteria based on
cultural similarity" (1996:76).
In addition to the four types of corporate cultures described by Cartwright and Cooper, three
categories of 'organisational marriages' are identified (1995:40) , each distinguished on the
basis of how the dominant or acquiring partner chooses to deal with the other entity's culture:
1. Enforce the dominant culture: In this instance the similarity of the two cultures is
not particularly relevant. It should be noted however that if the culture of the acquired
company is a power or role culture, the process of changing the culture of the acquired
organisation will tend to take place more quickly, due to the more centralised, top-
down approach of such entities.
2. Integrate the two cultures: Where this approach is taken, the more similar the
cultures the better (provided the merger is not between two power cultures, in which
case Cartwright and Cooper suggest that the likelihood of successful integration is
much lower). In this type of organisational marriage, while it may be straightforward
to recognise that, for example, two role cultures are similar to each other, it is
necessary to establish some basis for identifying similarities between different culture
types. Cartwright and Cooper use the levels of constraint placed upon individuals
within a culture to locate that culture on a continuum (See Figure 2-3 below).
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Depending on the distance between two prospective merger partners on the
continuum, the authors are able to describe the similarity of their two cultures for the
purposes of assessing the likelihood of a successful integration of the two corporate
cultures in question.
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3. Retain separate cultures: This is the least common of the three types, which involves
no cultural integration whatsoever, but allows the two distinct cultures to continue to
co-exist within the merged entity.
Cartwright and Cooper's model represents a helpful tool which managers may use to analyse
corporate culture and identify potential incompatibility problems well in advance of
embarking upon a merger.
2.2.3.2.2. The integration stage
The question of how managers should practically facilitate the integration process has been
addressed in Katinka Bijlsma-Frankema's work on managing cultural integration. This
section is based predominantly on her material.
Bijlsma-Frankema (2001:195) suggests that the first critical area to be addressed is unity
within the senior leadership team of the merged entity: "To what degree cultures are
integrated into a productive internal organisation is strongly dependent on integration within
the top management team". In order to successfully reproduce the same level of integration
throughout the new entity as that modeled by its leaders, Bijlsma-Frankema cites a number of
studies which suggest that the focus should be on developing trust between groups and
individuals. She suggests that trust is increased by (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2001:200):
1. Developing shared norms: This effectively reduces the risk of unnecessary conflict
through miscommunication by establishing clear, shared expectations within the
organisation. Closely related to this is the importance of facilitating regular dialogue
between groups and individuals.
20
2. Setting shared goals: Levels of trust will tend to increase as people are obliged to
depend on one another to achieve shared goals that they are not able to meet
individually or within their own group. .
3. Monitoring and intervening: Managers need to closely observe progress in the
development of trust and intervention may be called for in the form of deliberate
conflict resolution particularly in situations where expectations are misunderstood due
to cultural differences.
4. Creating 'psychological safety': Bijlsma-Frankema recognises that for many
employees the effect of a merger will be to create an insecure environment which may
result in fear-induced paralysis among some employees . She suggests that
management need to allow employees the freedom to fail in the early stages of
integration and ensure that constructive feedback is given throughout the process.
In summary, Bijlsma-Frankema maintains that if two corporate cultures are to be integrated
within a new entity, this is more likely to succeed first, if senior managers are able to model
the unity being pursued and second, if deliberate action is taken throughout the organisation
to increase levels of trust between groups and individuals by pursuing the four areas outlined
above.
The significant challenge of dealing with the clash of cultures can therefore be responsibly
addressed by understanding the two cultures, considering their compatibility and then
carefully managing the actual integration process.
2.2.3.3 The Human Resources challenge
Cartwright and Cooper (1995:35) report that mergers typically play havoc with the human
resource function, citing studies which show executive staff turnover at up to 75% in the first
three years after a merger and more junior staff turnover levels at 30% during the same
period. An increase in incidences of counter-productive staff behaviour such as absenteeism,
petty theft, stress, job dissatisfaction and lowered morale was also widely recorded during the
post-merger period. The authors conclude that "it is with justification that people have come
to be labelled the ' forgotten or hidden ' factor in merger success" (1995:35).
Acknowledging that human resources issues are closely related to questions of corporate
culture, this section nevertheless attempts to isolate some of the key areas requiring
management attention if the statistics cited above are not to be repeated in a given merger.
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2.2.3.3.1. Staff motivation
Kerr (1995:7), reviewing the successful takeover in the United Kingdom of Midlands Bank by
HSBC Holdings plc outlines some of the interventions made by management to ensure that
staff motivation was not adversely affected by the merger:
• A great deal of attention was given to communication. All staff members received
written notification of all organisational and operational decisions and particularly
information relating to changes to their own responsibilities. Kerr notes that other
communication lessons learned through the process were the need for a 'clearing-house'
for all staff communication to ensure that all staff are receiving the same message, and
second, the necessity of producing a staff version of every public press statement released
(1995:7).
• An ongoing commitment to staff training and development was demonstrated and key
staff members who occupied critical roles within the organisation were identified and
given particular attention (1995:7).
• Senior executives were called upon to 'walk-the-job' more than usual, meeting with more
junior staff than they typically would. One of their responsibilities was to keep in the
forefront of the minds of employees that the change taking place within the organisation
related not only to the effect of the merger, but also to the ongoing need to change in
accordance with customer needs and the dynamic environment within which the company
operated (1995:7).
Covin et al (1997:22) emphasise the impact of the individual manager on the attitudes of
employees within a recently merged entity. They cite studies identifying individual managers
and their handling of the implications of the merger as "the major focal point for most
employees during a merger". Other studies cited by Covin et al stress the need for excellent
communication, transparency and deliberate attempts to increase employee participation in
the process.
Panchal and Cartwright (200 I :424) report a predictable increase in employee stress levels
following a merger, but the researchers were surprised to find that this was noticeably more
apparent among staff formerly employed by the dominant acquiring company. Their study
examined the effects of stress in three broad areas:
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1. work attitudes (job satisfaction, organisational commitment)
2. psychological well-being (state of mind, resilience, confidence)
3. physical well-being (physical symptoms, energy levels)
The authors hypothesised that the 'subordinate' company's employees would experience a
greater increase in stress levels due to being required to make more adjustments than those
required of employees of the dominant partner. However, the results showed a more
significant decline injob satisfaction and organisational commitment on the part of the former
employees of the dominant company. The authors attributed this surprising finding in part to
the nature of the two organisational cultures involved. Using Harrison 's typology (See
Cartwright and Cooper, 1996:65), the authors classified the dominant company as a role
culture, while the subordinate company displayed a support culture which provided sufficient
flexibility and more relational support which enabled these employees to better weather the
impact of the merger.
2.2.3.3.2. Staff remuneration - reconciling remuneration through job evaluation
Inevitably the amalgamation of two distinct organisations will require a process of reconciling
the differences between remuneration packages of the respective employees. This process
may be achieved by conducting organisational job evaluations, which Hunter (2002: 116)
describes as
the process of analysing and assessing the content of jobs in order to place
them in an acceptable order or hierarchy which can then be used as a basis
for employee compensation.
While the process does not specifically contemplate the harmonising of terms of employee
remuneration following a merger, it does attempt to establish a fair basis for compensating
employees where limited or no rational basis for differentials were previously maintained and
in that sense appears to be helpful for reconciling post-merger employee compensation
discrepancies.
Hunter (2002: 119) outlines the steps necessary in order to establish a job evaluation system as
follows:
1. Choose ajob evaluation system (such as Paterson or Peromnes).
2. Prepare job descriptions, based on detailed job analyses.
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3. Establish a job evaluation committee, comprising a range of stakeholders with good
knowledge of the organisation. Provide training for the members.
4. Evaluate jobs according to the chosen system.
5. Establish minimum and maximum pay rates for each grade of job. This is typically
done by a combination of comparing the existing rates with data gathered from
industry.
6. Set a policy to deal with anomalies (salaries that fall outside the range for a particular
grade). A typical policy may correct anomalies by increasing salaries, promoting or
demoting an employee, providing training to ensure an employee is able to work at the
required grade, or freezing a salary until the maximum pay rate for that position
catches up.
7. Decide which additional benefits to apply to each pay level.
The use of a job evaluation system therefore provides the means of dealing with remuneration
differences and ensuring that all employees in a merged entity are dealt with in terms of a
unified, transparent system.
2.2.3.3.3. Key appointments
In her description of the Midlands Bank acquisition by HSBC, Kerr (1995 :8) describes a
centralised recruitment process that took place within the holding company. This afforded all
potential applicants within the various divisions of the merged entity the opportunity to apply
for key posts within the organisation. Applicants would be short-listed and selected according
to usual corporate recruitment policies. Critical to the success of this process was its
transparency and the deliberate efforts made to ensure that all qualified applicants received
notification of available posts being filled.
2.3. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the various incentives for pursuing a merger and described the
synergies that may be available to merging organisations. Notwithstanding the general
optimism with regard to mergers however, it has been noted that the majority of mergers fail
and the most common reasons for this have been highlighted.
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Clearly, if managers are to embark on the process of a merger, sufficient safeguards must be
put in place to ensure that the risk of failure is managed. The chapter concludes with several
approaches to dealing with the prospect of merger failure in general and people and cultural
issues in particular.
While this chapter has fairly universal application, the study focuses on a potential merger
between two South African non-profit higher education institutions. The next section of this
study therefore addresses issues relating to the particular context within which this merger
would take place.
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3. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED MERGER
While the previous chapter considered the literature relating to mergers in a broader sense,
this chapter narrows the focus to concentrate on the context within which the proposed merger
being considered in this study would take place. Attention is given to factors particular to
organisations that operate in the area of higher education in South Africa, specifically the
non-profit portion of that sector. In addition, the immediate contexts of each institution are
addressed.
3.1. Factors particular to non-profit organisations
La Piana and Hayes (2005: 11) observe that there is an increase in the number of mergers
taking place in the non-profit world, which they attribute first, to the potential for greater
efficiency in merged organisations and second, to the ongoing financial pressures faced by
such institutions. While they concede that experience of mergers in the corporate world will
be of use to non-profit leaders contemplating a merger, the authors insist that the following
key differences must be borne in mind when considering the amalgamation of two non-profit
entities:
• The missions of the two organisations drive the process. The individual missions must be
similar or compatible.
• The merger parties are treated as equals. It is more appropriate to speak of a partnership
than the acquirer-target language of the for-profit sector.
• The merger process is collaborative rather than adversarial. Negotiations are typically
handled through a jointly-hired consultant and legal advisers only appear once the deal
has been settled, in contrast to the aggressive role attorneys may play in a commercial
merger.
• The interests of stakeholders are critical. Throughout the merger talks, stakeholders must
be kept well informed and, unlike in the for-profit sector, any adversarial actions by either
party will typically be frowned upon by stakeholders .
• Resources are extremely scarce - much more so than in the for-profit sector.
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3.2. Mergers in Higher Education
Just as non-profit organisations operate in a distinctly different environment to profit-making
entities, so too are educational mergers noticeably different from other corporate
amalgamations. This section explores some of the distinct issues pertinent to higher education
mergers in general, addressing the 'soft' issues of people and culture in an educational setting,
as well as some of the logistical complications peculiar to a higher education environment.
Finally, the South African higher education scene is considered, particularly dealing with the
impact of legislation enacted in the post-1994 era.
3.2.1 Cultural integration in Higher Education mergers
Harman (2002:94), reflecting on the surfeit of mergers in Higher Education in Australia
during the late 1980's and 1990's cautions that although two given educational organisations
may appear on the surface to be highly compatible with one another and likely to achieve
significant synergies by amalgamating, this impression may be upset by underlying cultural
differences'. Moreover she contends that the very nature of a higher education institution is
likely to create complications when it comes to cultural integration. Harman goes on to
suggest that management analysts who assume that culture can be developed and manipulated
for the benefit of an organisation have underestimated the entrenched nature of culture within
universities ,
which are probably unsurpassed as homes for contested views,
contradictions, debate and intellectual conflict. Indeed, universities do not
merely house these conflicts, but generate them. (2002:97)
It must be noted however that Harman 's study focuses particularly on educational mergers
which she describes as being the joining of "unequal partners" (2002:93), where a university
is merged with a training college.
3.2.2 Managing the human resource in Higher Education mergers
In a study of employees in a South African university during the initial phases of a merger,
Amolds and Boshoff (2004:10) found that employees generally exhibited low levels of
commitment to top management and unhappiness regarding working conditions and benefits.
The study unsurprisingly demonstrated a direct relationship between commitment and
performance levels. The variable which impacted organisational commitment the most was
the commitment of individual employees to top management, leading the authors to stress the
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importance of the active participation of top managers in the merger implementation process
and the critical nature of open communications.
Hay et al in their study of University of the Free State's staff perceptions of the value and
necessity of merging three Colleges of education, found that the majority of respondents saw
the necessity for the merger, but 97.2% of all staff members surveyed indicated experiencing
some measure of personal insecurity at the prospect of the merger. The authors concluded that
the management of staff fears should be a key concern for university leadership, and that
concerted efforts should be made to ensure that regular, accurate communication with staff
members was maintained throughout the process (2001:107).
Of interest in the Hay study were the perceptions of staff members regarding the gains to be
had from a merger - employees identified the scale benefits from better utilisation of human
and physical resources as the top two reasons to merge. The top three priorities which staff
felt were necessary for a successful merger were first, the commitment of top leadership to the
process, second, clear mission and goal formation, and third, effective communication within
and between the three institutions (2001:106).
3.2.3 MUlti-campus factors and structural options
This section considers models proposed by two South African authors who have addressed
the question of multi-campus institutions. At the time that their articles were published,
Nicolson and Botha were employed by public universities both of which were significantly
impacted by the Department of Education's merger plans in South Africa (the University of
Natal and Vista University respectively).
3.2.3.1 Nicolson's models
Nicolson (2004:346) notes that 80% of higher education students in the USA are registered
with multi-campus institutions and that such institutions are becoming increasingly common
in countries such as Australia, Canada and Great Britain. He suggests that in South Africa,
while there are compelling state policy reasons for the mergers of various government
universities implemented by the Minister of Education, if left to their own devices these
institutions would not have freely chosen to merge into multi-campus entities.
According to Nicolson (2004:350), the typical implications of adopting a multi-campus
system include:
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• Greater complexity of the management task;
• The need to create a common sense of purpose between two campuses, notwithstanding
their completely separate histories;
• Logistical issues and the impossibility of face-to-face meetings to the same extent as
previously;
• Computer, library and financial systems capable of handling the distance challenge;
• Consistent human resources policies over the entire entity;
• Consistency of academic curricula.
Nicolson recognises that a multi-campus system may take several forms, depending
particularly on the level of autonomy retained by each campus. He identifies four models for
multi-campus higher education systems (2004:351):
1. "Shark and pilot fish": This model involves a central, dominant campus at which all
of the institution's main programmes are offered. Small campuses which offer only
very specialised programmes constitute the pilot fish in the model.
2. "Flagship and satellite(s)": In this instance, the satellite is controlled by the larger
flagship and offers only limited (usually undergraduate) programmes.
3. "Partnership of equals": In terms of this model, both campuses offer a full range of
programmes and neither dominates the other in terms of governance.
4. "Partnership of differences": This model involves two campuses offering different
and complementary programmes.
Nicolson (2004:352) observes that the first two models are considerably easier to administer,
as in both instances one campus dominates and governs the other. The third and fourth models
invariably complicate the administration of the institution and require leadership to choose a
point on a continuum between a centralised administration system (institution-wide faculties,
human resources administration, etc.) and a decentralised system where resources are
allocated on a per-campus basis. The first extreme on the continuum is efficient from a
resource use perspective, but unlike its opposite, does not give due consideration to the
individual character of each campus.
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Nicolson identifies one critical concern with multi-campus systems, namely that students and
staff tend to give their primary loyalty to their home campus, rather than the combined
institution. He warns that
if we destroy the ethos of the local campus in order to create a monolithic
uniformity we will often destroy the goose that lays the golden egg, the
place where students and alumni place their loyalty and pay their money.
(2004:353)
3.2.3.2 Botha's models
Botha (2001:277) offers an alternative approach to that of Nicolson, using three potential
structures for merger or co-operation between two higher educational institutions.
Figure 3-1 below illustrates a "Confederal structure" where two entities continue to maintain
their autonomy, but collaborate on areas of mutual interest or need. This is essentially a
strategic alliance or joint venture, which allows for some cost-saving benefits but with
minimal impact on staff and corporate culture.
Figure 3-1 Confederal structure
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Source: Botha, 2001:277
Figure 3-2 below shows Botha's federal structure, where certain functions are delegated to
separate campuses, with a central administrative headquarters retaining all other necessary
powers and functions. This structure necessarily has implications for corporate culture, but
potentially will deliver greater scale benefits and other efficiencies.
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Figure 3-2 Federal structure
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The third model considered by Botha (2001:277) is a full merger into a single entity- the
unitary structure (illustrated in Figure 3-3 below), which offers the greatest scale benefits, but
at the price ofmajor disruption to staff and significant logistical challenges.
Figure 3-3 Unitary structure
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While Nicolson in particular is mindful of the growth in the number of multi-campus
institutions on a global scale (2004:346), the value for the purposes of this study of both
Nicolson and Botha's work is that they have written from within the South African context.
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More specifically, Nicolson and Botha have written from within two South African
institutions which have been forced to give very careful consideration to the complexities of
multi-campus organisational management due to the decisions of public education policy-
makers in South Africa. This context is the focus of the following section.
3.2.4 Private higher education institutions in post-1994 South Africa
The higher education landscape has been dramatically altered in the years following the
coming to power of South Africa's first democratically elected government. This has been
most noticeable amongst the public institutions, where a major consolidation exercise has
resulted in a series of mergers of tertiary institutions (Arnolds and Boshoff, 2004:2).
While government has confined its restructuring exercise to public institutions, its educational
reforms have certainly impacted private organisations. The enactment of the Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997, has had a number of implications for private higher education
institutions:
• All private tertiary institutions are now required to be registered in order to continue to
operate (section 51). Failure to comply with this section constitutes an offence , which if
followed by a conviction may, in terms of section 66, result in a fine or prison term for
either the statutory crime or for fraud.
• Registration as a Private Higher Education Institution is subject in terms of section 53, to
an assessment of institutional financial and infrastructural viability (conducted by the
Department of Education) as well as academic accreditation by the South African
Qualifications Authority (established by the South African Qualifications Authority Act
58 of 1995). In practice, the accreditation and quality assurance function is controlled by
the Council on Higher Education (CHE), with the South African Qualifications Authority
(SAQA) retaining a fairly limited role in this process (restricted to administering the
National Qualifications Framework).
• Institutions may no longer operate as trusts or associations, but are required to register as
companies or close corporations (section 51). For non-profit organisations, this effectively
requires registration as a section 21 (not for profit) company, which the Companies Act 61
of 1973 defines as a public company. This in turn has resulted in a host of regulatory
implications for organisations that previously functioned as small voluntary associations.
32
• Although registration as a company or close corporation necessarily means that an annual
external financial audit is mandatory, the Higher Education Act nevertheless also spells
this requirement out in section 57(2).
The Department of Education's third white paper gives some insight into government's
attitude to private higher education and the thinking behind the provisions of the Higher
Education Act:
The Ministry recognises that private provision plays an important role in
expanding access to higher education, in particular, in niche areas, through
responding to labour market opportunities and student demand. The key
challenge in expanding the role of private institutions is to create an
environment which neither suffocates educationally sound and sustainable
private institutions with state over-regulation, nor allows a plethora of poor
quality, unsustainable 'fly by night' operators into the higher education
market (1997:21).
The Department of Education's efforts to remove 'fly-by-night operators' have resulted in a
significant decrease in the number of private institutions operating in South Africa, of which a
healthy proportion are theological institutions. In a 2003 report on the state of private higher
education in South Africa, the CHE reported (2003: 10) that of the programme accreditation
applications received in 2002, religious educational bodies were second in number only to
private business colleges, as illustrated in Table 3-1 below.
Table 3-1 Programmes submitted to the CBE by discipline 2002
DISCIPLINE NUMBER %
Business administration 55 25.3
Religion 32 14.7
Information technology 30 13.8
Marketing and public relations 27 12.4
Communications and media 20 9.2
Education and training 16 7.3
Graphic and fashion design 14 6.4
Aromatherapy and others 9 4.1
Tourism and hospitality 8 3.6
Architecture and manufacturing 6 2.7
Total 217 100
Source: Council on Higher Education, 2003:10
Table 3-2 below reveals that of the 58 institutions applying for accreditation in the same
period, only 24% received full accreditation and nearly one in five institutions were denied
registration (effectively forcing their closure). In the area of programme accreditation, the
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institutions perform even worse , with 18% being accredited and just under a quarter being
refused accreditation.
Table 3-2 Re-accreditation outcomes of institutions and programmes 2002
INSTITUTIONS % PROGRAMMES %
Full accreditation 14 24.1 40 18.4
Conditional accreditation 30 51.7 120 55.2
De-accreditation 10 17.2 51 23.5
No decision 2 3.4 6 0.9
Total 58 100 217 100
Source: Council on Higher Education, 2003:41
Table 3-3 below contains information from the CHE 's 2003/4 and 2004/5 annual reports
illustrating the success rate of accredited private institutions applying for programme
accreditation in 2003 and 2004.
Table 3-3 Programme accreditation success rate 2003-2004
2003-2004 2004-2005
Programme accreditation 45% 62%
Source: Council on Higher Education, 2004:36 and Council on Higher Education, 2005:40
In summary, notwithstanding the gains to be had on a macro level in terms of potential quality
improvements in national private higher education, smaller institutions are now obliged by
law to operate out of unwieldy corporate structures, deal with three new educational bodies,
file several additional annual reports and incur the additional expenditure related to audit and
government application fees. In addition, institutions that fail to meet the CHE 's standards run
the risk of closure. These factors clearly make the option of co-operation with another
institution particularly attractive to small institutions which struggle to meet the new demands
of the current legislative environment.
The Higher Education Act governs tertiary institutions, while secondary level institutions are
required to comply with the provisions of the Further Education and Training Act 98 of 1998.
This act to a large extent mirrors the provisions of the Higher Education with regard to the
requirements for institutional registration and programme accreditation, save that it applies to
' further education and training programmes' , which are defined in section 1 as
all learning and training programmes leading to qualifications from levels 2
to 4 of the National Qualifications Framework as contemplated in the South
African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (Act No. 58 of 1995), which
levels are above general education but below higher education;
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3.2.5 The Pietermaritzburg context
The geographic context of this study is Pietermaritzburg, which appears to be one of, if not
the strongest theological studies centre in South Africa. The city is home to the University of
Kwa-Zulu Natal's (UKZN) School of Religion and Theology, which has in recent years
drawn considerable support (in the form of students and funded academic staff members)
from mainline church denominations, with the Lutheran Church, the United Congregation
Church of Southern Africa, the Anglican Church (CPSA) and more recently the Methodist
Church of Southern Africa all strengthening their ties with the school. In addition, St Joseph 's
Catholic Theological Institution is based in Cedara, just outside Pietermaritzburg, and draws
Catholic students from all over the continent.
These two institutions , together with ESSA, form the Pietermaritzburg Cluster of Theological
Institutions - an unusual association spanning a range of theological positions, but benefiting
members through combined library holdings, regular staff and student interaction and the
facility for students to register for courses in the other two institutions.
Although the strengthening of theological education in Pietermaritzburg is bound to positively
impact upon ESSA and UBI through exposure to a range of other scholars and proven
methods, one implication of the increasing number of denominations pledging their support to
UKZN is the insistence of those church groups that their students study together in that
institution, which is likely to result in a reduction in student numbers for ESSA and UBI.
3.3. Institutional backgrounds
This chapter concludes with a brief description of the history and current status of ESSA and
UBI.
3.3.1 The Union Bible Institute
UBI was founded in 1942, after initial planning meetings commenced just prior to the
outbreak of World War II in 1939. These early meetings drew together missionary leaders
from four different mission agencies with a view to establishing a joint Bible institute. Three
acres of land in Sweetwaters, just outside of Pietermaritzburg, were donated to the school for
use as its campus by the Swedish Holiness Union Mission in 1940 (Johanson, 1971 :6).
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Wetmore reflecting on his experiences as a staff member at UBI, describes UBI's 'niche' as
secondary level Bible training for Zulu students (2005:14). Johanson, founding Vice-principal
of UBI clearly placed the emphasis on practical education:
The standard of education also varies considerably. But we have not
attached any great importance to this. The purpose of the UBI is not so
much to be a training school with the emphasis on training, as a Bible
School with the emphasis on the Bible. We do not minimise the value of
education, but if we had insisted on an entrance qualification measured in
terms of years spent at school, we would have missed the privilege of
having among our graduates many men who have become highly respected
leaders in their churches. (1971 :44)
Missionary support in particular of UBI during the years of its existence has enabled the
institution to develop an impressive campus with the potential for ongoing development of the
land (See Appendix E). Although the majority of the founding mission agencies are no longer
connected to UBI, two agencies which continue to support UBI are SIM (Serving in Mission)
and TEAM (The Evangelical Alliance Mission), both of which provide funded staff to UBI as
well as limited financial contributions to assist with operating expenses.
UBI has for many years offered a three year Diploma in Biblical Studies. In 2000 , UBI
entered into an agreement with the University of Zululand in terms whereof, UBI graduates
were enabled to upgrade their diploma to a Bachelor of Theology by completing a further year
of studies at UBI. While the arrangement was initially advantageous to UBI in that it allowed
the institution to control the academic content of the degree and furthermore to receive a
portion of the government subsidy allocated to the university, it now seems likely that by the
end of 2008, the relationship will be terminated. This appears to be due to government
unhappiness regarding the university's inability to adequately administer and control quality
in its remote campuses. With this in mind, UBI has begun the process of seeking CHE
accreditation in its own name for its degree programme.
UBI's diploma is offered in two streams - English and Zulu medium. In addition to its
residential programme, UBI operates a Zulu medium extension school in Madadeni.
UBI operates out of a Section 21 company, which is governed by a board of directors. This
structure was put in place in order to comply with the requirements of the Higher Education
Act as discussed in 3.2.4 above. The previous governing body (the UBI Council) still exists,
but it functions only as an advisory group made up largely of representatives of organisational
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stakeholders. The Council meets annually, whereas the Board meets six times each year and is
directly involved in the management of the institution.
3.3.2 The Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa
Wetmore observes how the need for an institution like ESSA was first identified by leadership
at UBI. The vision for ESSA grew out of the recognition of the need for a tertiary level multi-
denominational theological institution to be established to serve a market that lay beyond the
parameters of UBI's own constituency. In his unpublished manuscript on the story of ESSA,
Wetmore recalls that the UBI Council agreed at a meeting held in 1974 "that UBI had a vital
niche in the market for secondary level Bible training, but that it should investigate the
creation of a new tertiary level training institution for black evangelical ministers" (2005:14).
Further meetings held in 1975 expanded the initial vision to define the demographic and
geographic target group of the new seminary as being people of all races from the Southern
African states who had received the equivalent of a matric certificate (Wetmore 2005: 15).
The campus was deliberately sited in the heart of Pietermaritzburg - a commitment which
continues to be reflected in ESSA's mission statement today - and the first students began
classes in February 1980. Today the ESSA campus occupies an entire city block (see
Appendix E) and permission has been sought from the Pietermaritzburg Municipality to
purchase a portion of Pine Street and enclose the campus.
ESSA offers a Bachelor of Theology (in Mission and Ministry or Church and Development) ,
which is provisionally accredited by the Council for Higher Education. An unaccredited three
year diploma will fall away from 2007 to make way for a new one year certificate, which will
provide access to the BTh for students without matric exemptions , or serve as a stand-alone
qualification. At present ESSA also offers a one year certificate which is not accredited by the
CHE, which will be replaced by the new certificate in 2007.
ESSA teaches an honours level programme in Evangelical Theology on behalf of the
University of KwaZulu Natal. The agreement with the University essentially entitles ESSA to
charge fees for this programme, with the government subsidy earned in respect of the students
accruing to the University.
ESSA has been incorporated as a Section 21 company, although the structure of the
organisation differs from that of UBI. The directors of the company are employees of ESSA,
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namely the management team of the seminary, comprising the Principal and the Directors of
Finance, Academics , Student Affairs and Fundraising and Communications. The Chairperson
of the Council is also a director of the company. The role of the ESSA Council is akin to that
of shareholders in that the Council appoints the directors. In addition, the ESSA Council
approves the annual financial statements and operating budget of the company.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter has concentrated on the specific context within which this merger would take
place - namely that of a non-profit, higher education environment in Pietermaritzburg, South
Africa. Throughout the chapter the focus has been progressively narrowed, concluding with a
brief background of both of the institutions.
From this point in the report, the focus moves away from the theoretical framework and
begins to address the question of this specific merger, beginning in the next chapter with a
discussion of the research methodology employed in this study.
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The preceding chapters outlined the theoretical framework and the specific context within
which this merger would take place. This chapter proceeds to consider the methodological
approach which was adopted in this study in order to address the research problem .
4.1. Research objectives
This study considered two theological institutions in Pietermaritzburg, both of which have
been in existence for many years (UBI for 64 years and ESSA for 26 years), but which were
both increasingly experiencing a great deal of pressure from a range of external forces in their
respective contexts . It was the effect of these pressures in particular that compelled managers
in both institutions to consider new strategic options for the two organisations.
One proposal which had been mooted was a merger of the two organisations. Whether or not
such a strategy would be advantageous to both institutions was by no means a foregone
conclusion. The primary objective of this research was therefore to assess:
The feasibility and desirability of a merger between the Evangelical
Seminary of Southern Africa and the Union Bible Institute.
The study aimed to provide recommendations to assist the leadership of both institutions in
making a decision regarding the wisdom of pursuing a merger. In addition, a suggested
merger process was outlined in the event that at some stage in the future the decision is
ultimately taken to proceed with the merger.
4.2. Research design
The two major questions being addressed in this study were the feasibility and desirability of
a merger between ESSA and UBI. Although the issues were clearly related, each called for a
different methodological approach and they are therefore dealt with separately under this
section.
4.2.1 Merger feasibility
For the purposes of assessing the feasibility of a merger, the question was subdivided into a
number of smaller, more focused units, so that the report ultimately reflects on the feasibility
question from the perspective of:
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• Financial factors affecting merger feasibility and the likelihood of the ongomg
sustainability ofthe combined entity.
• Currricular compatibility - the likelihood of being able to harmonise existing
academic programmes.
• Human Resources issues dealing with questions of employment conditions,
redundancies, redeployment and the cultural compatibility of the two staff teams .
• Student body factors - the likelihood of being able to create a united student body
and address the different cultural and logistical issues pertinent to this.
• Strategic Fit - the compatibility of the missions and strategic approaches of the two
organisations. Questions relating to the compatibility of the target markets of the two
institutions are covered here.
• Stakeholders - the extent to which the stakeholders in the two entities will be capable
of co-existing and working towards a common purpose.
• Operations - particularly related to the challenge of operating a multi-campus
institution. Library and information technology related questions are covered here.
• Legal implications - questions relating to the legal structure of the merged entity and
the requirements of the various statutory bodies which the individual organisations are
accountable to at the time of the merger.
In gathering data to address the question of merger feasibility in all its constituent parts, three
major sources were utilised, namely: existing documents, records and policies from within
each institution and including external legislation; interviews with staff and Board or Council
members; and a questionnaire designed to address the issue of cultural compatibility.
4.2.1.1 Records and policies
The following institutional records, policies, legislation and other documentation were
examined with a view to assessing whether a merger would be feasible :
• Financial statements of both institutions for the previous three financial years (See
Appendix C)
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• Staff handbooks and standard conditions of employment.
• Academic policies and institutional prospectuses.
• Constitutional documentation.
• Government legislation.
Information gathered from these listed sources either complemented data collected from the
interviews and the questionnaire, or when dealing with questions such as the legal
implications of a merger, provided all of the information outlined in the appropriate section of
the findings chapter of this study.
4.2.1.2 Interviews with staff and board members
Appendix B provides details of the twenty interviews conducted with staff and Board or
Council members of both institutions . Interviews were conducted during the period 17 August
2006 to 1 September 2006. They were held on the ESSA and UBI campuses, at the
workplaces of several Board and Council members and in one case a UBI staff member on
furlough in the USA gave input via email.using the interview guide as a basis for organising
his perspectives on the question of merger feasibility. The typical length of each interview
was between 30 and 45 minutes although several interviews lasted in excess of an hour.
Appendix D contains the guided interview outline used for the interviews listed in Appendix
B. The outline followed the basic distinction made in this chapter between merger feasibility
and desirability. When being interviewed on the question of merger feasibility, interviewees
were asked to comment generally on their perceptions of the likelihood of a merger
succeeding whereafter they were questioned specifically on concerns or challenges related to
their own area of specialisation. A further general question was raised relating to the likely
challenges of operating in a multi-campus system and specific suggestions were canvassed as
to how this may be achieved in practice.
The group of individuals interviewed was chosen on the following bases:
• The entire management teams of both institutions were interviewed. This ensured that the
perspectives of the respective Principals and heads of departments were reflected in the
findings.
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• Selected key employees from both institutions were also interviewed, focusing especially
on the feasibility of a merger with reference to their particular area of expertise (two
examples of such key employees were the respective librarians and information
technology officers). Although the two staff teams are not large, only selected members
were identified, based on whether or not, in the opinion of the researcher, they were likely
to be able to contribute material pertinent to the various subsections of the broad
feasibility question.
• The Chairpersons of the UBI Board and the ESSA Council were interviewed. One
additional member of each of these bodies was also interviewed. The two additional
members were chosen on the basis of convenience and ease of access. Both Principals
were also ex officio members of the respective institutional governing bodies and were
also able therefore to make a contribution from this perspective .
• One additional person was interviewed who is neither a Board or Council member nor an
employee of either institution, but who previously served on the board of UBI for many
years, was a founder Council member of ESSA and a member of staff at UBI. His views
were sought particularly with reference to the founding vision for ESSA and a perspective
on the respective missions of the two organisations.
Wherever interviews are referred to in the body of this report, individuals are deliberately not
identified where this is possible. These were the terms on which informed consent was given
by each participant in the study (See Appendix G) and in order to ensure that interviewees felt
free to be candid when offering subjective opinions, anonymity was guaranteed. At the same
time, many of the interviewees were colleagues of each other (or potential colleagues if a
merger takes place) and the preservation of positive working relationships has been borne in
mind in the way that data is presented .
4.2.1.3 Questionnaire
A questionnaire was distributed amongst the staff of both institutions . The instrument was
designed to address one question - the nature of the organisational culture of each
organisation. This was completed only by employees of the respective institutions on the
grounds that other stakeholders, such as Council or Board members were not considered
sufficiently immersed in the respective organisational cultures as expressed in the day-to-day
operations of the two institutions to be qualified to describe them.
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The questionnaire was drawn in its entirety from Cooper and Cartwright (1996:72), who in
turn based the instrument design on work done by Harrison and Stokes in 1990. The authors
stress that because of the abridged nature of the questionnaire, it is not intended to be
"diagnostic", but rather to give a general impression of the culture of each organisation. It is
therefore acknowledged that the questionnaire was not able to provide a definitive description
of organisational culture, but rather to add to other evidence gathered in reaching a reasoned
conclusion under the findings section of this study.
The instrument consisted of eight multiple choice questions (see Appendix A), with each
question offering a choice of four alternatives (a, b, c or d) of which only one could be
selected. Subject to Cooper and Cartwright's disclaimer, a majority of:
• ' a' answers suggests a ' task/achievement' culture
• 'b' answers suggests a 'person/support' culture
• 'c' answers suggests a ' power' culture
• 'd' answers suggests a ' role' culture.
These four culture types correspond with Cooper and Cartwright's classification as discussed
in 2.2.3.2.1 above.
4.2.1.4 Instrument validity and reliability
Cartwright and Cooper (1996:72) state very clearly that this instrument is not intended to
provide a precise diagnostic tool but rather to give a general impression of the culture of an
organisation. They cite the abbreviated nature of the questionnaire in particular as the ground
for avoiding any claims of validity as a diagnostic tool. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the
instrument was nevertheless used on account of its having been designed by the authors
whose classification of culture types is used in this study. Due to the limitation of the
instrument, any findings based on the results it produces cannot be regarded as conclusive, but
merely persuasive.
The instrument was only used once in the course of this study and no participants in the
survey were asked to complete the questionnaire on more than one occasion in order to assess
its reliability.
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Consideration was given to using an additional questionnaire to assess perceptions of merger
feasibility in other areas, but initial interviews suggested that employees from both
institutions knew so little about the specific workings of the other organisation that any
surveying of perceptions relating to the feasibility of specific aspects of a merger would in all
likelihood be highly speculative. For that reason, focused interviews with selected individuals
dealing with specific sections of feasibility within their areas of expertise were preferred to a
second questionnaire.
4.2.2 Merger desirability
This section of the research was less concerned with the practical feasibility of a merger and
focused more particularly on the perceptions of key members of the two communities. The
collection of this data took place exclusively by way of interviews with selected staff and
board members.
The sample used to gather this data was the same group of selected individuals which
provided material for the feasibility question. It would have been ideal to survey the entire
staff and Board or Council bodies regarding their views of the desirability of a merger.
Nevertheless the sample group appeared to represent a sufficient range of stakeholders within
the two institutions to give a helpful impression of the views of the two communities.
The first of the two major sections in the Interview guide set out in Appendix D dealt with the
question of merger desirability. Interviewees were asked generally whether in their view a
merger was desirable for their institution and thereafter questioned about their perceptions of
the other institution and specifically whether they had any concerns or fears regarding the
possibility of being merged with that particular institution. In light of the fact that it was not
possible to survey all stakeholders in each institution and further in view of the fact that many
of the organisational stakeholders were represented by individuals among the group
interviewed, each interviewee was asked to comment on their perception of particular
stakeholder reactions to the proposed merger.
4.3. Research limitations
The scope of the research undertaken was limited by the time period and the financial
resources available with which to conduct the study. In addition, although the researcher had
an intimate knowledge of ESSA, having been an employee of the institution since 2001,
information relating to UBI was sourced entirely from interviews conducted during 2006.
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It must also be noted that students were not included in this process, although they certainly
are important stakeholders. In addition, other institutional stakeholders were not contacted
directly for their perspective on the desirability of a merger, although attempts to gauge their
respective views were made where possible when individual staff or Board or Council
members connected to particular stakeholders were interviewed. The decision to preclude
student involvement and to restrict direct access to institutional stakeholders was taken by the
leadership of the two institutions in order to limit the speculation and potential harm that may
have resulted from a widely publicised study, given that no decision had been taken to merge
and the need for sensitive management of potential stakeholder concerns.
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5. FINDINGS
Having outlined the methodological approach adopted in this study, this chapter proceeds to
set out the findings which emerge from the questionnaire, interviews and various
documentary sources examined. Where necessary, clarifications or observations have been
made, but the implications of any particular finding are only considered in the following
chapter, where findings are analysed in the light of the literature and the contexts of the two
institutions.
The structure of this chapter follows that of the methodology chapter, with the findings





This section relies on the financial statements of the institutions (for the past three financial
years) and interviews with an independent chartered accountant (who has been contracted by
both institutions in recent years to assist with the preparation of annual financial statements)
and the respective finance officers within each organisation. The financial statements were
prepared by the respective independent auditing firms of the two institutions (with the
exception of UBI's June 2003 accounts which predate UBI's employment of external
auditors). General observations regarding financial stability and fundraising ability are
included from interviews with other senior members of the two staff teams.
5.1.1.2 Key fmancial ratios
Table 5-1 below illustrates several ratios relating to liquidity, profitability, the source of each
institutions' income and the impact of the salaries on total expenditure (Income Statements
and Balance Sheets for both institutions covering the last three financial years are set out in
Appendix C).
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Table 5-1 Selected financial ratios for the past three financial years
UBI ESSA
Year end 30.06.2005 30.06.2004 30.06.2003 31.12.2005 31.12.2004 31.12.2003
Debtors / Income 119543 / 53326 / 43455 / 197572 / 149590 / 150536 /
from students 704053 563883 466285 910192** 743993** 611297**
0.17 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.2 0.25
Salaries / Total 663332 / 625736 / 478112 / 1092481 / 1168171 / 1031030 /
expenses 1440931* 1226459* 1025368 1668371 1776190 1506371
0.46 0.51 0.47 0.66 0.66 0.68
Current ratio 374205 / 368227 / 619327 / 521004 / 158204 / 186302 /
(Current assets / 291547 304839 367416 862378 465078 402019
current liabilities) 1.28 1.2 1.69 0.6 0.34 0.46
Income from 704053 / 563883 / 466285 / 910192** / 743993** / 611297** /
students / Total 1443456 953027 1080062 1834156 1718993 1342251
income 0.49 0.59 0.43 0.5 0.43 0.45
Net profit / Total 51084 / (214354) / 40502 / 23350 / (57198) / 37718 /
income 1443456 953027 1080062 1834156 1718993 1342251
0.04 -0.22 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.03
* Adjusted to remove the effect of timing of receipts of staff salary support.
** Total income from students is the sum of student fees and student rental income.
Where necessary, the data set out in Table 5-1 is commented upon in the sub-sections which
follow.
5.1.1.3 Controls and infrastructure
The generally held view among senior staff of both institutions (as well as one independent
observer) is that ESSA's controls and administrative infrastructure are better developed than
those of UBI. By way of example, the view of one independent observer was that ESSA 's
phased operating budget and budgetary controls are significantly more sophisticated than the
measures in place at UBI. As a result, much of the management of departmental budgets at
ESSA is delegated to departmental heads, while the approval of expenditure at UBI has been
centrally controlled by a single financial administrator.
Notwithstanding this , ESSA has had a much poorer track record than UBI in the management
of student debt. Table 5-1 notes that in the last three financial years debtors have made up
between 20% and 25% of ESSA's total student income at year end, compared to between 9%
and 17% at UBI. In addition, the data suggests that UBI employs a less risky cash
management strategy (current ratios for UBI range between 1.2 and 1.69, while ESSA 's
corresponding figures are much lower - between 0.34 and 0.6).
5.1.1.4 Sources of funds
Several UBI staff members expressed the perception that ESSA has been significantly more
successful than UBI in raising funding for capital projects. A number of UBI staff members
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identified UBI's failure to develop donor relationships as a significant weakness. UBI has
received assistance from abroad for campus development projects, but aside from the funding
of a number of its staff members , receives very little assistance with general running costs.
ESSA employs a Director of Fundraising and Communications who is a member of the ESSA
management team. His department oversees donor relations and handles the preparation of all
funding proposals. ESSA has had a great deal of success during the past decade raising funds
for capital projects and student bursaries. Much less success has been experienced with
attempts at fundraising for operating costs, save for one British trust which contributes in the
region of 20% of ESSA's total expenditure per year. While the contribution of this trust is
critical to ESSA's ongoing viability , it does mean that the institution is very vulnerable should
the trust at any stage take a decision to terminate this arrangement.
Both organisations rely heavily on donor support - Table 5-1 indicates that between 41% and
57% of UBI's income during the past three financial years has been derived from non-student
sources, while the corresponding figure for ESSA during the same period is between 50% and
57%.
5.1.1.5 Student numbers trends
Table 5-2 below illustrates a trend of falling student numbers in both institutions over the past
three years. Declining numbers at UBI are partly due to the suspension of the University of
Zululand Bachelor of Theology, which at present is only available to pipeline students and
will end in 2008. ESSA has maintained the size of its BTh Honours class, but has seen a
major reduction in undergraduate numbers during 2005 and 2006. This is partly attributable to
the decision of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa to send all of its
students to the University of KwaZulu Natal (including several students who had already
commenced their studies at ESSA). The decline in numbers has prompted the establishment
of an ESSA task team to improve communication with organisational clients and actively
recruit students.
Table 5-2 Student numbers 2004-2006
UBI Dip UBI Dip UBI Total ESSA ESSA ESSA ESSA Total
(English) (Zulu) BTh BTh Dip Cert BThHon
2004 54 44 5 103 33 28 5 9 75
2005 49 29 9 87 27 23 5 10 65
2006 42 27 7 76 15 15 11 10 51
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Although UBI has consistently recorded significantly higher student number than ESSA over
the last three years, ESSA generates more income from its student body than UBI does on
account of UBI's tuition fees being much lower than ESSA's as is reflected in Table 5-3
below.
Table 5-3 Student tuition fees: Comparative costs.
Qualification UBI ESSA Qualification
Diploma in Biblical Studies R5400 Rl1900 Bachelor of Theology
Residence and catering R4500 R4300 Self-catering residence
5.1.2 Academic programmes
5.1.2.1 Sample profile
This section relies on documents published by both institutions (prospectuses and degree and
course outlines) as well as interviews with the respective academic deans and seven other
academic staff from both institutions (two from ESSA and five from UBI).
5.1.2.2 Curricular compatibility
On the face of it, ESSA and UBI's degree level curricula do have much in common.
Appendix F lists the courses comprising the two qualifications and there clearly is much
overlap. The differences in curriculum emphases are:
• The UBI curriculum is deliberately very bibliocentric, with a greater number of
courses dealing with individual biblical books, while ESSA's approach has generally
been to deal with each type of biblical genre without attempting to exhaustively cover
all the scriptural material.
• Staff members from both institutions identified ESSA's greater focus on
contextualised theology and development studies issues.
• UBI appears to give greater attention to Homiletics (preaching) and the training of
expository preachers was identified by UBI academic staff as one of the critical
outcomes pursued throughout the degree programme.
The entrance requirements for the two qualifications differ significantly , with the ESSA
degree requiring a matric exemption, while the UBI diploma grants admission on the strength
of a grade 10 pass. This allows for the possibility that a student may enter the UBI diploma
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without a matric exemption and yet emerge with a degree from the University of Zululand by
completing the additional credits required for the Bachelor of Theology upgrade.
The role of UBI's Zulu stream diploma was raised by a number of staff members from both
institutions, with a minority being of the view that it addressed a niche in the market that is
not being catered for elsewhere and therefore constituted a valuable part of UBI's present
offerings. Most interviewees, while recognising the value of secondary level Zulu medium
tuition, were of the view that it should not be extended to the tertiary level if graduates are to
be equipped to engage effectively with scholars from elsewhere in Africa and the world.
5.1.3 Human Resources
5.1.3.1 Sample profile
This section draws on the respective institutional staff handbooks, interviews with the
Principals, the two staff members responsible for human resources at UBI and, regarding
ESSA, the researcher's own knowledge ofESSA's staffing policies.
5.1.3.2 Staff profile comparisons
Table 5-4 below categorises the staff members at each institution by function.








The following observations emerge from the interviews and documentation, read with Table
5-4:
• Both Principals have administrative roles, but are considered part of the teaching staff
team. A significant disparity in the size of the respective academic staff teams is
apparent, with UBI having the benefit often to ESSA's six academic employees. As a
consequence, ESSA makes much greater of external guest lecturers than UBI does. Of
UBI 's ten academic staff members two hold doctorates, three have masters degrees,
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one holds an honours degree and four hold bachelor's degrees. Two of the six ESSA
academic staff members hold doctorates, with the remaining four all holding masters
degrees.
• In addition to the Principals performing dual functions, employees of both institutions
are frequently called upon to cover portfolios outside the scope of their primary
functions. By way of example, both institutions draw on the time and energy of
academic staff for the supervision of maintenance work on the respective campuses.
• ESSA's student accommodation is self-catering. A member of the ESSA support staff
arranges catering for functions or guests, but no staff members are employed
exclusively for catering purposes, unlike UBI which employs three staff members for
this purpose.
• In maintaining its grounds and facilities, UBI draws to a great extent on its student
body. ESSA does have student 'action groups', but their role is limited by comparison.
This is reflected in ESSA's need to employ four grounds staff members compared to
UBI's two, notwithstanding the size of UBI's campus.
• Both institutions have a management team, which works alongside the Principal , with
each member being allocated a particular portfolio or portfolios.
5.1.3.3 Staff employment conditions
Salaries
Although the researcher had unhindered access to the salary details of ESSA staff members,
complete access to the equivalent UBI records was considered inappropriate, and
consequently a limited comparison of salary levels was all that was possible. For the purposes
of this comparison, the average salary paid to a lecturer at UBI was compared with the
corresponding figure at ESSA, with the UBI salary being approximately 79% of the ESSA
salary equivalent. Both institutions fall well short of market related salaries.
Benefits
Both institutions contribute to a pension scheme on behalf of employees (with a
corresponding contribution being made by the employee). ESSA covers half of the monthly
cost of medical aid membership and also operates a small internal medical savings fund,
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where staff contributions are matched. UBI does not offer any medical aid support to its staff,
but the majority of staff members are given free accommodation as part of their remuneration.
5.1.3.4 Externally funded staff
Ten of the twenty-two UBI staff members are externally funded. The entire ESSA staff body
is funded from operations (although a number of ESSA employees have succeeded in
securing regular donations to the seminary in order to offset a part of the costs of their
salaries).
UBI's expatriate missionary staff members do not disclose their income to the institution,
with the result that there is no means of ensuring income parity among externally funded
employees. The benefit of having staff paid for from abroad is also offset by the fact that such
employees are ultimately answerable first to their mission agency, who may recall / redeploy
them on their own terms. This clearly impacts on UBI's ability to exercise control over its
employees and also hinders effective succession planning.
5.1.3.5 Job descriptions and evaluation
A number of UBI staff members stressed the need for job descriptions to be regularised and
for greater accountability to be maintained in the form of regular employee performance
appraisals. Neither institution effectively links its employee remuneration with performance
appraisals at present and, although ESSA does have job descriptions in place, these are in
need of review.
Historically, ESSA has made use of the Peromnes job evaluation system. This means that the
various posts are graded on the Peromnes scale, but the system has not been reviewed on a
regular basis and is in need of an overhaul. UBI does not make use of any job evaluation
system.
5.1.3.6 The role of Principal in a merged institution
Both Principals were specifically questioned on their attitude to the selection of the Principal
of a merged institution. They reported that this question had been raised in their discussions
with each other and that both leaders were willing to relinquish the senior post in favour of
the other or a third party if need be in order that the combined entity might best fulfil its
mission. The two Principals suggested that it would be helpful to seek advice from an external




This section relies particularly on interviews with the Student Dean of UBI and the Director
of Student Affairs at ESSA. Additional material from interviews with other senior staff
members is also incorporated.
5.1.4.2 Ethnic diversity
A number of ESSA staff members expressed their appreciation for the multicultural and
multinational student body, which is perceived by them as being a particular feature or
strength of the ESSA community life. The Department of Education requires that statistics be
kept classifying all students by country of origin and race group. Table 5-5 below illustrates
the multinational and multicultural nature of the ESSA student body during the period 2004 to
2006, with between 24% and 31% of students being non-South Africans, who were originally
from ten or eleven different (mostly African) countries. The majority of students at ESSA are
Black, but significant numbers of other race groups are also represented .
One staff member, while expressing appreciation for the multicultural nature of ESSA's
student body, recalled how there had been a number of struggles over the years arising out of
clashes between cultures that necessitated intervention from the seminary leadership.
Table 5-5 Classification of ESSA students by country of origin and race group
Total South Number of other Black White Indian Coloured
students African countries represented
2004 75 76% 11 68% 20% 9% 3%
2005 70 70% 11 71% 16% 11% 1%
2006 51 69% 10 65% 18% 15% 2%
UBI does not maintain the type of statistics set out in Table 5-5, but one UBI staff member
confirmed that the student body was made up almost entirely of Zulu-speaking Black South
African students during the period 2004-2006. This homogeneity is perceived by some UBI
staff members as a strength of the institution. One UBI staff member raised the perception
that ESSA is not as concerned with investing in the Zulu people of KwaZulu-Natal. The same
staff member expressed pride in the manner in which UBI has deliberately concentrated on
working with Zulu students. When this perception was put to a senior ESSA staff member,
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the response was that ESSA was established as a regional institution, for the express purpose
of serving the entire southern African region.
5.1.4.3 Student attitudes
One UBI staff member when asked about relations between ESSA and UBI students reported
that UBI students have perceived a sense of superiority among ESSA students, which has
resulted in defensiveness on the part of UBI students. Some ESSA staff members confirmed
having seen such attitudes being displayed by some ESSA students.
5.1.4.4 Community life
Although the majority of ESSA's students do live on campus, the fact that UBI's students are
fed together on campus, while ESSA's accommodation is self-catering, led interviewees from
both institutions to comment on the likelihood that there is a stronger sense of cohesiveness
within the UBI student community.
This perspective appears to be strengthened by the fact that students appear to spend more
time together in additional chapel services and other meetings on the UBI campus, than at
ESSA. A number of interviewees from both institutions perceive the devotional and spiritual
component oflife on the UBI campus to be stronger than that of the ESSA community.
5.1.5 Strategic Fit
5.1.5.1 Sample profile
This section draws on the founding documents of both institutions as well as interviews with
two ESSA Council members, two UBI Board members, four ESSA management team
members, four UBI management team members and one former ESSA Council member and
UBI staff member.
5.1.5.2 Constitutional documents
ESSA 's memorandum of association commits it specifically to provide tertiary level
theological education. The organisational objectives set out in the memorandum are:
• to provide excellent practical Christian theological education at a tertiary level for
both lay people and clergy.
• to work in partnership with the local church and parachurch organisations.
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• to support, advance and promote the growth of the Christian faith.
• to play an active role in the community in the areas of social development and
upliftment and in particular, HIV/AIDS education and care.
ESSA's mission statement is "to train dedicated Christian leaders, in an urban setting, for the
church-in-mission by providing quality tertiary education that is evangelical, holistic and
contextual.
UBI's corporate objectives are broader and are not subdivided in the manner that ESSA's are
as listed above. The organisation 's memorandum of association commits UBI to:
Develop Christ-like servant-leaders who are committed to Christ and His
great commission.
The UBI founding documents contain no specific constraints concerning the level at which
training is to be provided, although as noted earlier in this study, Wetmore records a statement
of the UBI Council at a meeting held in 1974 to the effect that "UBI had a vital niche in the
market for secondary level Bible training" (2005:14).
One member of the UBI staff team expressed a perception that UBI's vision is practical as
opposed to the more academic goals apparently pursued by ESSA. The same staff member
stressed their concern that UBI's vision not be lost in the course of any merger process, noting
that: "UBI's emphasis is practical, spiritual preparation for ministry, whereas ESSA seems to
place more emphasis on academics and preparation for further study".
5.1.5.3 Target markets
Neither the ESSA organisational objectives, nor its mission statement explicitly spell out the
geographic area of ESSA's operations, but as indicated by the name of the institution, the
ESSA staff members interviewed understand this to be the southern African region and
consequently describe the organisation's target market as being tertiary level students from
this region who hold to an Evangelical (as opposed to a liberal or Catholic) theological
position. Contrary to perceptions held by some UBI staff members, ESSA does not, according
to interviewees, aim to produce academics but rather deliberately targets students who intend
to complete advanced studies for the purposes of ultimately working as practitioners within
the Church or parachurch organisations.
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While not clearly spelled out in its founding documents, UBI's interviewees understand the
institution's target market to be Evangelical students possessing at least a grade 10 certificate,
pursuing practical training with a view to employing their skills within the Church or other
Christian organisations. UBI does accept students at secondary level, but is clearly also
targeting tertiary level students. The bulk of UBI's students are Zulu speakers drawn from the
KwaZulu Natal region and one interviewee expressed the view that this is UBI's primary
target market. Although UBI does draw students from elsewhere in the country , it does not
target students outside the country to the extent that ESSA does.
5.1.6 Stakeholders
5.1.6.1 Sample profile
This section relies on interviews with the ESSA Council and UBI Board Chairpersons, the
two Principals and two other UBI staff members who were able to shed light on the attitude of
two of UBI's institutional stakeholders.
5.1.6.2 Stakeholder compatibility
The ESSA Council may, in terms of its articles of association allow institutional members to
join the Council under certain prescribed conditions. At present only two institutional
members are active on the ESSA Council , namely the Free Methodist Church of Southern
Africa and the SIM mission agency. Both of these organisations are also active within the
UBI community
In addition to SIM, UBI's two other major institutional stakeholders are the Holiness Union
Church (an independent Southern African denomination) and the TEAM mission agency.
While the official structures of TEAM, SIM and the Holiness Union Church have not
formally considered the question of a merger, senior leaders and missionaries based at UBI
and who are connected to these stakeholders have all expressed enthusiasm or at least
openness in principle to the proposed merger. Based on the comments of leaders within the
three organisations, there appear to be no factors which would render a merger between UBI




This section includes data collected from interviews with the two librarians and the respective
administration and information technology officers.
5.1.7.2 Information Technology
UBI has eighteen computer terminals available for student use. Some of these share a printer,
but no network is established on the campus. Most staff members have computers in their
offices, but these terminals are not networked.
ESSA has ten terminals set aside for student use, all of which are connected to the campus
Local Area Network, with the result that students have shared printing facilities as well as
email addresses and internet access. All ESSA employees except for the grounds staff and the
housekeeper have computers in their offices. ESSA has established a well developed intranet,
with user authenticated access to student records , library holdings, staff records and a range of
policies and other documentation.
Given that UBI does not operate a LAN at present, a merger of the two IT systems would
appear to be relatively straightforward by means of a virtual private network if the physical
network infrastructure were to be established on the UBI campus.
5.1.7.3 Libraries
ESSA's library presently holds 17992 books , with 102 journal subscriptions. UBI holdings
total 9500 books , including a large collection of Zulu books, but only a very limited journal
collection. The holdings of both libraries are electronically catalogued. Both librarians were
of the view that the option of combining the two collections in one physical location should
not be given serious consideration. In the event of a merger, and assuming that the two
campuses were to be retained, the prospect of operating two libraries, each designed with a
particular academic programme in mind was considered feasible by both librarians. Students
would be able to borrow material from either library and material could be requested
electronically and shuttled daily between the two institutions.
5.1.7.4 Campus integration
Several staff members from both organisations raised the concern that unless the merged
institution operates out of a single campus, the amalgamation of student and staff bodies will
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never become a reality. One UBI staff member expressed the view that ESSA's campus
would be easier to sell given its central location and the proceeds of that sale could be
reinvested in the present UBI campus. While the idea merits consideration, two factors to be
considered are the R3 000 000 purpose built library presently being constructed on the ESSA
campus and the founding commitment of ESSA to be located in an urban setting.
Aerial photographs of the two campuses are included in Appendix E. Both properties have a
number of buildings set aside for residences, the difference between the two campuses being
the large number of staff residences on the UBI property and the different nature of the
accommodation - the ESSA accommodation being self-catering. There are very limited
expansion options on the ESSA campus while in the view of one UBI employee, the UBI
campus has sufficient room for major expansion of the existing buildings.
5.1.8 Legal implications
5.1.8.1 Sample profile
Data relating to the legal implications of a merger between ESSA and UBI is drawn from
government regulations promulgated under the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997.
5.1.8.2 Institutional and programme accreditation
Regulations published in terms of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 stipulate that "all
learning sites where registered programmes are delivered must be accredited" (Republic of
South Africa 2002:13) . This implies that even if ESSA and UBI were to merge and UBI
offered ESSA's BTh from its campus, it would be necessary for the UBI site to be accredited
in its own right by the Department of Education.
5.1.9 Cultural compatibility
The results of the cultural compatibility questionnaire completed by staff members of both
institutions are summarised in Table 5-7 below:
5.1.9.1 Sample profile
The staff members who completed the organisational culture survey are profiled in Table 5-6
below. Grounds and catering staff were not included in the survey.
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The survey was completed by all of the eligible ESSA staff members.
The researcher attended a UBI staff meeting and was given an opportunity to explain the
nature and purpose of the instrument, but although 80% of the UBI academic staff completed
the questionnaire, only two out of seven support staff returned completed surveys. The UBI
librarian had very recently been employed by UBI and did not feel qualified to comment on
the institution's organisational culture. The failure of further staff members to participate in
the survey appears to have been simply as result of employee apathy, although the possibility
of resistance to the idea of a merger cannot be conclusively ruled out. Ultimately ten UBI
staff members out of a possible sixteen employees (the librarian having been excluded)
completed the survey. The results of the survey are set out in Table 5-7 below.
Table 5-7 Results of organisational culture survey
Question UBI (10 respondents) ESSA (14 respondents)
A B C D 0 A B C D 0
1 6 1 1 1 1 9 2 3
2 6.5 2.5 1 8 4 1 1
3 9 1 10 4
4 5.5 3.5 1 12 2
5 7.5 1.5 1 9 5
6 6 4 5 4 5
7 8 2 11 2 1
8 4 4 2 7 7
Totals 52.5 18.5 3 5 1 71 30 5 5 1
% 65.6 23.1 3.8 6.2 1.3 63.4 26.8 4.5 4.5 0.8
The authors of the questionnaire caution that the simplicity and abbreviated nature of the
instrument preclude it from producing precise diagnostic claims (Cooper and Cartwright,
1996:72) however the data collected strongly suggests that the dominant organisational
culture (as per Cooper and Cartwright's model) identified by 65.6% and 63.4% of employees
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of UBI and ESSA respectively is that of a "Task!Achievement" culture , followed by a





This section relies on interviews conducted with the Chairpersons and one other member each
of both the ESSA Council and the UBI Board as well as the Principals of both institutions.
5.2.1.2 Interview responses
Interviewees were asked whether from their perspective a merger would be beneficial to the
organisation they represented. Most of the Board and Council members interviewed expressed
their support for a merger, citing as their reasons the importance of being unified in pursuing
one mission rather than the two institutions being in competition with each other, as well as
the benefits to be gained from avoiding duplication of efforts . CHE accreditation was
highlighted as a critical issue for UBI and a major incentive for merging from UBI's
perspective.
One person interviewed queried whether there were actually any significant savings to be
exploited from a merger. The concern was expressed that the two main academic programmes
offered by ESSA and UBI respectively appear to be pitched at very different academic levels
with the result that in order to maintain the two programmes, very little gain would be
experienced in terms of freeing up academic staff.
5.2.2 Staff perspectives
5.2.2.1 Sample profile
The interviews conducted with nme UBI employees (six academic staff members, two
members of the support staff team and the librarian) and five ESSA staff members (four
management team members and the ESSA librarian) provide the data for this section.
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5.2.2.2 Interview responses
A widely held perception among ESSA staff was that UBI staff would be very cautious about
a merger with ESSA, due to ESSA's being perceived as too liberal by virtue of ESSA's
relationship with the School of Religion and Theology at UKZN. This does not appear to be
an accurate perception, based on interviews with UBI staff members. Some UBI employees
acknowledged that this had been a concern in the past, but no UBI employees interviewed
implied that this would be an obstacle to a merger.
Most staff members from both institutions appeared unconvinced that a merger was desirable
and were cautious about the potential gains to be had from a merger in the short term. They
tended to be open in principle to the concept of an amalgamation, but were reluctant to
commit enthusiastically to the idea until tangible benefits or advantages could be spelled out.
In such cases, the need for greater co-operation between the two institutions was generally
acknowledged, but a more cautious approach, involving something falling short of a full
merger was typically proposed.
A number of staff members acknowledged their concerns relating to remuneration and job
security.
5.3. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the findings based on the interviews, questionnaire and other
documentary sources, without commenting particularly on their significance. The next chapter
recalls the theoretical and contextual framework considered earlier in the study and draws
some conclusions based on the findings set out in this chapter.
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6. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
The previous chapter set out the findings based on the interviews, questionnaires and various
documentary sources examined in the course of this study. This chapter considers the
implications of these findings, in the light of the theoretical and contextual framework
considered in the early chapters of this report. Once again, the chapter is structured around the
two major issues of merger feasibility and merger desirability.
6.1. Merger Feasibility
In assessing the feasibility of the proposed merger, this section begins by addressing three
preliminary questions which arise out of the general merger theory considered in chapter two,
namely:
1. the type of merger being contemplated and the effect of this on the merger's
feasibility;
2. the likely gains to be had from such a merger which, when weighed against the costs
or risks of the merger will suggest a finding vis-a-vis merger feasibility;
3. the typical risks or potential obstacles to a merger and their effect on the likely
feasibility of the amalgamation;
Following the discussion around these preliminary issues, the specific sub-sections of the
feasibility inquiry as set out in the methodology chapter are addressed in turn.
6.1.1 The impact of the nature of the proposed merger on its feasibility
Gaughan (2005:4) describes a horizontal merger as one which takes place between
competitors. ESSA and UBI compete for tertiary level students and for this reason a merger
between the two institutions may be considered a horizontal merger.
However, UBI's academic programmes clearly also caters for students at the secondary level
(as is evident from the grade ten entrance requirement for admission into the UBI Diploma in
Biblical Studies). Cartwright and Cooper (1996:3) note that where two organisations "from
successive processes within the same industry" merge, this constitutes a vertical merger. To
the extent that the UBI Diploma is a secondary qualification which articulates with or gives
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access to degree level studies, it may be argued that a vertical merger would actually be taking
place.
While the proposed merger may well incorporate both vertical and horizontal elements and
its precise nature may be the subject of some debate, what is clear is that the merger would
take place within one industry - namely the theological education industry. Porter 's research
(1987:41) demonstrates that such a merger (whether horizontal or vertical) is less likely to fail
than if it were a conglomerate merger (undertaken between two entities in unrelated
industries). The nature of the proposed merger between ESSA and UBI therefore improves
the likelihood of its succeeding.
6.1.2 Likely benefits of an ESSA / UBI merger
De Camara and Renjen (2004: 10) stress that potential merger partners must be able to identify
synergies that will result from a proposed merger. Such synergies may include operating
economies (Correia et al, 2005: 17.2), organisational growth (De Camara and Renjen,
2004:10), improved management (Damodaran, 2001:841) or greater market power
(Thompson and Strickland, 2003:92) brought about through the weakening of competitive
forces.
Although several of the UBI and ESSA employees and respective Council and Board
members interviewed questioned the real benefits to be had from a merger, most were of the
view that some gain could be had from 'reducing duplication' . This reduction of duplication
relates to the operating economies discussed by Correia et al (2005:17.2) in terms whereof a
merged institution may, for example, be able to increase class sizes (thereby better utilising
lecturer resources) or reduce administrative overheads by consolidating support functions
such as human resources or finance and administration.
What is apparent from the findings however is that should it transpire that the proposed
merger is essentially more vertical in nature than horizontal (ie if the UBI Diploma is
classified as a secondary qualification which articulates with rather than overlaps ESSA 's
Bachelor of Theology), the merged institution will not be in a position to benefit significantly
from increased class sizes and the consequent improved utilisation of lecturing staff. There
will nevertheless be some opportunities for academic staff specialisation if lecturing staff
operate within their subject field but teach in both a tertiary and secondary programme
(Correia et al 17.3). In addition, following Correia et aI's reasoning, increased specialisation
will be possible within other non-academic departments of the merged institution.
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Although operating economies within the academic function may only generate limited cost
savings within the organisation, there remains the possibility of a merged entity experiencing
significant operating economies in the area of various support functions, as these represent a
'horizontal' element of the merger. Correia et al (2005:17.2) cite the consolidation of
administrative and support functions as a typical scale benefit of merging and it should
therefore be possible following the proposed merger to employ for example, just one
bookkeeper or one Academic Registrar, with the result that an additional staff member
currently employed in that capacity would be released to be redeployed elsewhere within the
organisation.
In addition, where academic staff, for example, are involved in administrative or other
functions over and above their teaching responsibilities (such as supervising maintenance
projects as is the case in both institutions), the consolidation of the two maintenance
departments in this instance will result in indirect gains within the academic department of the
merged institution and better utilisation of the primary skills of the academic staff members
concerned.
The amalgamation of ESSA and UBI would, all other things being equal, result in a
weakening of competitive forces within the industry (Thompson and Strickland, 2003:92).
Students determined to study at an Evangelical institution in Pietermaritzburg, now faced with
less alternative choices, will tend to be more tolerant of increases in student fees than would
previously have been the case. This represents a strengthening of the institution's market
power as contemplated by Thompson and Strickland.
In summary, it appears from the findings that a number of potential benefits typically
accruing to a merged institution would be enjoyed by a combined entity in this instance,
however it is likely that minimal scale benefits would be seen within the academic department
in the event that UBI's Diploma in Biblical Studies is offered at a secondary level in the
merged institution.
6.1.3 Potential obstacles to a successful ESSA I UBI merger
Nguyen and Kleiner (2003:447) suggest that the major causes of merger failure can all be
categorised as either being due to poor planning or to poor implementation. Damodaran
(2001:837) stresses the importance during the planning stage of ensuring that a decision to
merge is based on genuine identifiable merger synergies and not merely management self-
interest or hubris (Gaughan, 2005:77). The attitude of the two Principals to their own
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positions within the merged entity would seem to indicate a lack of self-interest on the part of
senior management.
Bert et al (2003:42-43) insist that a merger should be implemented quickly and that the speed
of implementation is as important as the quality of implementation planning. The authors
maintain that a merger should be fully implemented within two years of commencing if the
full benefit of merger synergies is to .be enjoyed. When examining the findings in this study,
two opposing pressures are evident concerning the question of the speed of implementation:
1. Staff members from both institutions expressed the need for caution and supported
that view that increased co-operation between the two institutions would be
preferable to immediately pursuing a full merger. This view accords with
Gaughan's observation (2005:320) that a joint venture (or for that matter, a
strategic alliance) may provide the ideal (and relatively inexpensive) means of
testing a potential merger.
2. UBI Board members in particular stressed the need for the rapid implementation of
the merger, particularly in view of the pressure being exerted by government on
UBI to secure accreditation for its programmes
While the perspective of the UBI Board is straightforward to understand, any merger
undertaken will rely largely on the support and effort of the respective staff teams. If a merger
is to be pursued without first attempting some intermediate form of co-operation, staff will
need to be convinced of the clear necessity and tangible benefits of such a merger.
6.1.4 Cultural compatibility
The questionnaires completed by staff members returned a strikingly similar set of results,
with employees from both institutions identifying most clearly with a ' task/achievement'
culture (UBI 65.6%, ESSA 63.4%), followed by a 'person/support' culture (UBI 23.1%,
ESSA 26.8%). According to Bij1sma-Frankema work (2001:197), the similarity of ESSA and
UBI's organisational goals would be a further indicator of cultural similarity.
While Carter and Cooper (1996:80) are careful to stress that this simple instrument is not
suitable for full diagnostic purposes, the results returned give a clear indication of the
similarity of the organisational cultures within the two institutions. Cartwright and Cooper's
model, as illustrated in Figure 2-3 above suggests that there should therefore be no
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compelling reasons why a merger of two task/achievement cultures should in and of itself be
cause for concern. The model predicts that where two cultures are significantly dissimilar (as
measured by the levels of autonomy enjoyed by employees) cultural incompatibility problems
may be experienced.
Cartwright and Cooper (1996:65) describe a task/achievement culture as exhibiting high
levels of individual autonomy, a focus on outcomes over processes and being resistant to
formal structures. If the merger were to take place, the increase in the size of the institution
would require more formal structures and processes, particularly if practices were to be
harmonised across two campuses. Based on Cartwright and Cooper's model, some resistance
to these changes can therefore be anticipated from the staff on both campuses. The indications
of a secondary 'person/support' culture bodes well however for the ability of employees to
cope with change within a supportive work environment (as was the case in the study
conducted by Panchal and Cartwright , 2001:424).
6.1.5 Curricular compatibility
Although the curricula of programmes offered by ESSA and UBI have differing emphases,
the major factors which separate them are not particularly content related, but rather the level
at which they are offered and the medium of instruction. Academic staff interviewed were
generally supportive of the Zulu stream offered at a secondary level but opinions differed
regarding how appropriate a tertiary level Zulu theological qualification would be. A minority
were of the view that this would address a need not presently being met in the tertiary
theological education market, while most interviewees maintained that tertiary level
instruction should take place in the 'universal' language of English if students are to be able
to make use of materials and engage with scholars from other parts of Africa and the world.
The academic staff interviewed were all of the view that a combined institution should
continue to serve the two markets catered for by UBI and ESSA, with the result that a merged
organisation would be called upon to offer academic programmes at both secondary and
tertiary levels.
6.1.6 Strategic fit
The findings raise questions relating to the compatibility of UBI's present strategy to
strengthen its position in the tertiary education market and its broad mission to train Christian
leaders regardless of whether they are at secondary or tertiary level. A merger with ESSA
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would allow for the former to take place within a new institution without abandoning the
latter.
The question of academic levels aside, the two organisations have very similar missions -
both are concerned with working in partnership with the local church and with providing
practical theological education from an Evangelical perspective in order to equip ministry
practitioners . La Piana and Hayes (2005:11) stress that in non-profit mergers the compatibility
of organisational missions is of the utmost importance.
Given the similarity of organisational missions, a further significant advantage of a merger is
the intangible benefit of joining two Christian organisations around a common mission in a
display of unity rather than remaining in competition with each other. This expression of
unity in pursuing a shared vision was repeatedly raised by interviewees and although not
easily quantifiable is clearly of great importance to the stakeholders in the two institutions.
Both institutions deliver their product through residential training. UBI's experience In
extension campus work may provide an opportunity for the merged institution to offer tertiary
level extension classes - something which ESSA to date has not had sufficient resources to
pursue.
ESSA and UBI target distinctly different markets. UBI's market is Zulu speakers with at least
a grade ten certificate, drawn predominantly from the KwaZulu Natal area. ESSA targets
English speaking matriculants from all over Southern Africa. The two markets are not
however incompatible and, provided secondary level graduates have sufficient proficiency in
English to continue at tertiary level in English medium studies, these students have the
potential to increase the numerical strength of the tertiary programme.
6.1.7 Legal issues
Interviewees who advocated taking rapid steps to implement a merger in the short term were
generally very mindful of UBI's need for accreditation . The 2002 Regulations to the Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997 however suggest that even if a merger were to take place in the
short term, accreditation for the UBI campus would still need to be sought by the new entity.
That being the case, it would seem to be appropriate to prioritise the securing of accreditation
for UBI's existing programmes rather than rushing into a merger, what Nguyen and Kleiner
describe as "probably the biggest challenge [an] organisation faces" (2003:448), on account of
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the need for accreditation. Whether the accreditation to be sought on UBI's behalf would be
in terms of the Higher Education Act of the Further Education and Training Act is the critical
strategic issue that requires clarity and urgent resolution.
6.1.8 Financial viability
The purpose of examining the financial records of both institutions was to establish whether
or not the individual organisations are presently viable. Both UBI and ESSA have very strong
balance sheets , with significant fixed assets and no long-term debt. Both however have been
barely breaking even in operating terms (net profit ratios of under 5% have been recorded in
their last three years of respective operations with both institutions recording losses in the
2004 financial year). In light of this , any savings arising out of the increased efficiency of a
merged entity will be critical in order to contribute to the stability of the new institution.
An area requiring ongoing attention in both institutions is that of cash management and ESSA
in particular appears to have adopted a high risk cash management strategy, reflected in the
very low liquidity levels seen in Table 5-1 above (current ratios of 0.34 and 0.60 fall well
short of the corresponding figures during the same period at UBI of between 1.2 and 1.69).
Both institutions remain heavily dependant on external donors, with student fees only
accounting for between 43% and 59% at UBI and 43% and 50% at ESSA of total income. For
both organisations the major expense item in their respective income statements is that of staff
salaries (particularly in ESSA's case where two thirds of all costs are staff related).
Notwithstanding these potential risk areas, the administrative systems presently employed at
ESSA coupled with the sound cash and debt management practices at UBI would strengthen a
combined institution. Similarly, the well-developed fundraising department at ESSA would
stand a merged institution in good stead and the additional connections reflected in UBI's
large body of graduates and good relations with local churches would represent an
opportunity to develop the donor base of a merged institution.
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6.1.9 Human Resources
Both organisations would benefit from a strengthening of their human resources systems.
ESSA has much of the necessary framework in place Gob appraisals, job descriptions and job
grading) although the existing systems are in need of review. A benefit of a merger would be
the opportunity to redeploy an existing administrative employee in the area of human resource
management.
A merger would necessitate a full job evaluation process in the new entity, which would also
go some way towards strengthening existing employee accountability by clarifying
expectations and responsibilities. The process outlined by Hunter (2002: 116) aims to provide
an objective transparent means of assessing fair remuneration levels. In the course of this
process a policy would need to be established to deal with remuneration packages, which fall
outside of the parameters of the system.
Based on the superficial salary comparison exercise carried out in 5.1.3.3 above, indications
are that there should not be major discrepancies between existing compensation packages
offered by ESSA and UBI. The results of the comparative exercise suggested that UBI
salaries were approximately 21% lower than that of their counterparts at ESSA. This did not
however take the provision of free housing into account which would have the effect of
reducing the apparent disparity in compensation levels.
6.1.10 Campus cultures
Nicolson's (2004:352) warning regarding the difficulty of merging campus cultures is helpful.
Several staff members commented on the likelihood of distinct staff and student communities
remaining separate, and in particular the challenges of bringing a multi-cultural student
community together with a mono-cultural group. These will be issues requiring careful
management by leadership of a merged institution.
6.1.11 Operations issues
Nicolson observes that multi-campus systems generally involve a more complex managerial
task, a struggle to integrate and unite two distinct campus cultures and a range of logistic
challenges such as technology, library and finance systems and scheduling challenges
(2004:350). The general consensus of interviewees in this study was that the two existing
campuses should be retained (although a number of staff members in particular echoed
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Nicolson's remarks about the difficulty of creating a sense of common purpose and shared
values across two campuses).
The decision to sell one of the campuses should not be dismissed out of hand, but in the short
to medium term in any event, it would seem to be prudent to operate out of the existing two
campuses, particularly as any plans to integrate the campuses would in all likelihood involve
significant construction work over an extended period of time.
ESSA's existing information technology infrastructure is well established. UBI already
possesses much of the computer hardware necessary to take advantage of this infrastructure
and the establishment of a virtual private network whereby staff and students have access to
central information from both campuses does not represent an insurmountable challenge.
The two libraries have been developed with distinctly different programmes and needs in
mind (for example, the UBI library contains an impressive collection of Zulu works, while
ESSA's library subscribes to a large range of journals which provide material appropriate for
tertiary level studies).
6.1.12 Stakebolder compatibility
La Piana and Hayes (2005:11) highlight the key role of stakeholders in a non-profit merger
and the importance of keeping them informed. The findings chapter indicates that the
involvement of the Free Methodist Church of Southern Africa and SIM in both institutions as
well as the openness to a merger expressed by local TEAM and Holiness Union Church
leaders suggest that there are no grounds for concern in the area stakeholder incompatibility.
6.2. Merger Desirability
With some exceptions, most staff members when interviewed were cautiously optimistic
about the prospect of a merger, but hesitant given the likely effort required and the probable
disruption and impact on personal security. Unsurprisingly, Board and Council members
tended to be more enthusiastic about the prospect of a merger, given the fact that they are not
likely to be impacted by an amalgamation to the same extent as the employees of the two
institutions.
Staff members within both organisations are working under significant pressure and
managing a range of portfolios beyond that for which they were directly employed. It is to be
expected therefore that any moves to begin merger planning may well be met by apathy or
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even open resistance. Staff interviewees nevertheless were generally supportive of the idea of
a merger, although not if it meant that the process would take place in the near future. Other
forms of organisational co-operation were suggested by staff as alternative plans for
immediate implementation.
The two Principals and the ESSA Council and UBI Board Chairpersons are all very much in
favour of a merger. Their leadership will be critical if the full staff teams are to buy into the
vision and support its implementation.
6.3. Conclusion
Based on the findings set out in this chapter, it can be concluded that a merger between ESSA
and UBI appears to be feasible. Regarding the desirability of the merger, organisational
stakeholders are generally positive about the prospect of amalgamation. Interviewees
identified some clear benefits of merging and were generally supportive of the principle of
being united around a common vision. Staff members tended to be more conservative than
any other group, opting for some other form of co-operation between the two organisations in
the short term.
The senior leadership of both institutions are very supportive of this initiative and their role in
providing their colleagues with an incentive to commit to this vision will be decisive.
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7. CONCLUSION
A merger between ESSA and UBI is feasible. As far as the desirability of a merger is
concerned, there are some clear benefits to be had from embarking on a merger, but whether
they are sufficient to justify the high risk of failure remains to be seen. What is apparent is
that the staff bodies of both institutions are ambivalent about the gains to be had from a
merger, particularly if the implementation of that decision were to take place in the near
future. If a decision is taken to pursue amalgamation, the role of both institutional leaders in
selling and implementing the vision will be critical.
An approach which would be sensitive to staff concerns would be to implement a joint
venture or strategic alliance of some form while continuing to investigate and plan for a
merger in the longer term.
Should the merger be pursued, management attention will need to be given to the quality of
merger planning and implementation and particularly the challenge of integrating two distinct
(although ostensibly similar) cultures. The recommendations set out in the following chapter
outline the process that should be pursued by leaders of the two institutions.
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the feasibility of the proposed merger, the following recommendations are made to
the respective leadership teams of ESSA and UBI, focusing particularly on the appropriate
processes that should be employed if a merger is to be successfully implemented in the
middle to long term:
8.1. Joint task team
De Camara and Renjen (2004 :11) attribute the success of the HP-Compaq merger to the
excellence of its planning. A dedicated task team was established to plan the details of the
merger, before final approval had actuall y been given to the merger deal. This team, which
comprised senior staff from both companies, produced a detailed roadmap to guide the merger
process.
In the case of this proposed merger, although there does not appear at this stage to be a
groundswell of support from the employees of ESSA and UBI for the immediate
implementation of a merger, the establishment of such a task team would allow a group of
senior employees and Council or Board members to plan a limited joint venture or strategic
alliance (such as the joint offering of a certificate or extension programme), while continuing
to develop a roadmap for a full merger at a future date.
8.2. Critical process issues
In the course of designing the merger roadmap, attention should be given to the following
critical issues :
8.2.1 Addressing staff concerns
Hay et al (2001 :107) report that 97.2% of employees in a South African university
experienced some measure of personal insecurity at the prospect of being merged with
another institution. Kerr 's reflections on the successful HSBC Midlands Bank merger
(1995 :7) highlight the value of outstanding communication, ongoing investment in staff




La Piana and Hayes (2005:11) stress the importance of ongomg consultation with
organisational stakeholders throughout the process . In the course of this study students and
organisational stakeholders have not been directly consulted due to concerns that this would
result in unhelpful speculation and publicity. The task team will have no such restrictions and
must ensure that stakeholders are fully informed of the progress ofthe merger process.
8.2.3 Identifying risk and success factors
Bert et al (2003:45) list the major reasons for merger failure in Figure 2-2 above. The task
team should take cognisance of their list, as well as the success factors listed in Table 2-1
above and produce a checklist of factors requiring ongoing monitoring. Such a list would
need to stress the importance of ongoing senior management commitment to the process
(Kerr, 1995:7) and an awareness of the potential problems arising out of cultural
misunderstandings.
8.2.4 Speed of implementation
De Camara and Renjen (2004:11) maintain that a merger should be fully implemented within
two years. In this instance, the recommendation is to initially pursue a joint venture of some
form, while continuing to shape plans for a full merger in the medium to long term. This does
not however mean that the sense of momentum of the process can afford to be lost (Bert et al,
2003:45). If the process is to energise employees , it is imperative that it be seen to be active
and enthusiastically supported by top leadership (Covin et al, 1997:22).
8.3. Designing the roadmap
This section makes recommendations regarding decisions to be made by the joint task team.
These suggestions clearly are not intended to unduly constrain the task team, but represent
attempts to draw conclusions from the theoretical and contextual framework based on the
findings set out in this study:
8.3.1 Organisational Structure
If the primary scale benefits to be had from a merger between UBI and ESSA are likely to be
experienced in the area of the administrative functions, it may be concluded that the
appropriate structure within which such a merged institution should operate corresponds to
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Nicolson 's 'partnership of differences' model (3.2.3.1 above) or Botha 's federal structure
(3.2.3.2 above).
Nicolson's model allows for the existence of complementary programmes on different
campuses , without any suggestion that one campus dominates the other (as is implicit in his
'flagship and satellite' model). The use of this approach would ensure that the secondary level
programme is recognised and valued for its unique contribution, rather than being perceived
as a poor substitute for the tertiary level qualification.
Botha's federal structure envisages one central administrative body operating in conjunction
with two or more distinct campuses. This type of arrangement is necessary if the scale
benefits of combined administrative functions are to be enjoyed. Clearly this is an ideal as
there will need to be some basic administrative functions taking place on both campuses. In
addition, it may be pragmatic for the combined administrative function to be located in two
venues (for example, finance on one campus and human resources on another).
8.3.2 Organisational mission
While ESSA's target market is clearly defined in terms of the level at which training is
offered, some ambiguity exists regarding UBI's programmes. The Diploma in Biblical
Studies must be offered as either a secondary or a tertiary qualification. This has implications
for the accreditation of the qualification, with secondary level qualifications being governed
by the Further Education and Training Act 98 of 1998 as opposed to the Higher Education
101 of 1997. It is recommended that the Diploma be offered at the secondary level, the effect
of which is that the application submitted by UBI to the CHE need no longer be pursued.
Having made this critical decision, it will now be possible to develop an organisation vision
and mission statement which is broad enough to encompass all of the programmes to be
offered by the joint institution.
8.3.3 Organisational name
La Piana and Hayes (2005: 11) note that in a non-profit merger it is not helpful to use the
'acquirer-target' language of the for-profit world. If the two institutions are to be treated as
equal contributors, consideration should be given to choosing a new name for the institution.
This process should involve participation from a wide range of organisational stakeholders.
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8.3.4 Managing cultural integration
Once the merger implementation process commences, special care needs to be taken to ensure
that the integration of the two corporate cultures is well managed. This is critical
notwithstanding the apparent similarities in corporate culture between ESSA and UBI.
Bijlsma-Frankema maintains that the focus of managers during a process of cultural
integration should be on developing trust between groups and individuals (2001:200), which
she suggests can be achieved through developing shared norms, setting shared goals,
monitoring and intervening where conflict resolution is necessary and creating 'psychological
safety' by allowing employees to fail in the early stages of integration and then giving
constructive feedback.
Bijlsma-Frankema also reiterates the importance of senior management involvement, noting
that cultural integration is assisted when senior leaders are able to model the unified culture
(2001:195). For the purposes of this merger, it is imperative that this unity be modelled by the
joint task team. Also, in order to facilitate deepening levels of trust between groups and
individuals, employees, students and other stakeholders need to be given regular opportunities
to be together both socially and in shared organisational events.
8.4. Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the recommended process to be followed by leaders of ESSA and
UBI in order to pursue the implementation of a merger of the two institutions in the medium
to long term. In the short term, a joint venture or strategic alliance of some form is proposed
in order to allow stakeholders from both institutions to test the cultural fit of the merger
parties and to draw other stakeholders into the merger process. The task team is also required
to map out a plan for the full merger of the two entities, ensuring that stakeholders are
consulted and that excellent communication is a feature of the process.
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9. FUTURE RESEARCH
Apart from the constraints placed on this research by limited time and financial resources, this
study has been limited in that it has been restricted to canvassing the opinions of selected staff
and Board or Council members. Ideally , students and other stakeholders should also have
been a part of this process.
In the course of ongoing merger discussions between ESSA and UBI leadership, it has
become apparent that the Durban Bible College is also interested in the possibility of being
incorporated into a merged theological institution. While there would clearly be greater
logistical challenges involved in merging with a Durban-based entity, this proposal merits
investigation and could be the subject of further research.
Finally, although a majority of staff members interviewed were uncertain of the value of a
tertiary level theological qualification offered in Zulu, a study considering the demand for
such a qualification would be valuable.
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APPENDIX A - ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE SURVEY
Source: Cartwright and Cooper, 1996:72
Consider the following items, and choose the one response which most applies to your
organisation:
1. In this organisation, individuals are expected to give first priority to:
a. Meeting the challenges of the individual task in which they are involved.
b. Co-operating with and attending to the needs of their fellow workers .
c. Following the instructions of their superiors.
d. Acting within the parameters of their job description.
2. The organisation responds to members as if they were:
a. Associates or colleagues.
b. Family or friends.
c. Hired help.
d. Contracted employees.
3. In this organisation, people are motivated and influenced most by:
a. Their own commitment to the task.
b. The respect and commitment which they have for their eo-workers.
c. The prospect of rewards or fear of punishment.
d. The company 'bible' or rule book.
4. A good employee is cons idered one who:
a. Is self-motivated and willing to take risks and be innovative if the task
demands it.
b. Gets along well with others and is interested in their self-development.
c. Always does what his/her boss tells him/her to do without question.
d. Can be relied upon to stick to company rules.






6. In this organisation, decisions tend to be:
a. Made by people on the spot who are close to the problem and have the
appropriate task expertise.
b. Made after considerable discussion and with the consensus of all those
involved regardless of their position in the organisational hierarchy.
c. Referred up the line to the person who has the most formal authority.
d. Made by resorting to established precedents.
7. It is most important for a new member of this organisation to learn:
a. To use his/her initiative to get the task completed.
b. How to get on with hislher fellow workers.
c. Who really counts in this organisation and be aware of political coalitions.
d. The formal rules and regulations.
8. The dominant managerial style of this organisation is:
a. Democratic and open.
b. Supportive and responsive to individual needs and idiosyncrasies.
c. Authoritarian.
d. Impersonal and remote.
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Lecturer I IT specialist
Librarian
Former UBI staff member,
founding member of ESSA
Council
Note: The researcher is employed as ESSA's Director of Finance and Administration with
responsibilities including financial and human resources management, as well as IT and
institutional accreditation. Information relating to ESSA in these areas therefore is drawn
from the researcher's own working knowledge.
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Donations 7 849819 763 138
Interest and Dividends Received 1 130 1 410
Library Income 11 297 28 373
Management Fee 30248 21 370
Rental Income - Students 182764 154937
- Other 38 405 34 190
Student Fees 428533 336992
Sundry Income 1 893 1 841
TOTAL INCOME 1 544089 1 342251
EXPENDITURE 1 506371 1 363681
Accountancy Fee - Current year 10000 4000
- Unprovision prior year 7000
Actea 4416 6524
Advertising 426 2372
Audit Fee - Current year prov ision 6000 10000
- Overprovision prior year (4 984)
Bank Charges 8823 12834
Bad Debts 1 341
Bad Debt Provision reversed 17000 (12000)
Chapel 560 962
Cleaning, Refreshments & Hospitality 13 401 8908
Cluster 1 602 847
Computer Licences & Maintenance 931 629
Conferences 230
Council Expenses 708 697
Depreci ation 56858 49246
Electricity and Water 57243 45028
Exchange Loss 9732 19327
Insurance 23695 13 421
Interest paid 35835 920
Lease Costs on Equipment 13 932 14 142
Lecture Costs 19414 10539
Levy Paid 33845
Library Expenditure 21 336 9 948
Loss on Investments Realised 10964
Postage 5817 2 912
Printing, Stationery and Photocopies 18077 13 235
Publicity 27485
Rent Paid 7500
Repairs and Maintenance 8 64501 52025
Salaries and Wages 1 031 030 962673
Security 4768 1 690
Student Expenses 21 020
Sundry Expenses 5544 3949
Telephone 48733 48329
Travel 1 382 730
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Donations 7 747057 959874
Interest and Dividends Received 5487 . 1 130
Library Income 146338 11 297
Management Fee 26400 30248
Rental Income - Students 208724 182 764
- Other 36308 38405
Student Fees 535269 428533
Sundry Income 13 410 1 893
TOTAL INCOME 1 718993 1 654 144
EXPENDITURE 1 776 190 1 626426
Accountancy Fee - Current year 10000 10000
- Unprovision prior year ( 800) 7000
Actea 3663 4416
Advertising 426
Audit Fee - Current year provision 6000 6000
- Overprovision prior year (2894) (4984)
Bank Charges 11 610 8823
Bad Debts 47058 1 341
Bad Debt Provision reversed 27000
Bursaries 23467
Chapel 560
Cleaning, Refreshments & Hospitality 10410 13401
Cluster 481 1 602




Electricity and Water 61 890 57243
Exchange Loss ( 116) 9732
Insurance 28299 23695
Interest paid 25304 35835
Lease Costs on Equipment 23298 13932
Lecture Costs 19 187 19414
Library Expenditure 14414 21 336
Postage 5810 5 817
Printing, Stationery and Photocopies 15917 18077
Publicity and local Fundraiser 80939 110055
Repairs and Maintenance 8 69700 64501
Salaries and Wages 1 168171 1 031 030
Security 3966 4768
Student Expenses 28599 21020
Sundry Expenses 9711 5544
Telephone 50509 48733
Travel 2027 1 382



















CURRENT ASSETS 158204 186302
Accounts Receivable 149590 150536
Free Methodist Foundation 8601 35720
Cash 13 46






























CHE EVANGELICAL SEMINARY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE COMPANIES ACT)
:NCOME STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2005
2005 2004
INCOME Note R R
Revenue I 058388 953039
Library Income 76336 146338
Management Fee 28800 26400
Rental Income Students 212335 208724
Rental Income Other 43060 36308 -
Student Fees 697857 535269
Other Income 775768 765954
Donations 7 773764 747057
Interest Received 768 5487
Sundry Income 1236 13 410
TOTAL INCOME I 834 156 I 718993
EXPENDITURE
Administrative expenses 1 668371 I 631 929
Accountancy Fee - Current year 10000 10000
- Unprovision prior year ( 940) ( 800)
Actea "3695 3663
Advertising 1454
Audit Fee - Current year provision 5000 6000
- Overprovision prior year (l 776) (2894)
.Bank Charges 11 908 11610
Bad Debts 71 058 47058
Book Publishing 3000




Exchange Loss ( 116)
Insurance 20083 28299




Printing, Stationery and Photocopies 14866 15 917
Publicity and local Fundraiser 167380 80939
Repairs and Maintenance 8 47954 69700
Salaries and Wages 1092481 I 168171
Security 4824 3966
Staff Expenses 2349
Student Expenses 30933 28599
Sundry Expenses 10 360 9711
Telephone 59331 50509
Travel 7816 2027
Other operating expenses 106233 118958
Bursaries 23467
Electricity and Water 53840 61 890
Lecture Costs 37405 19 187
Library Expenditure 14988 14414
Financing Costs 36202 25304
SURPLUS/(SHORTFALL) FOR THE YEAR 23350 (57 198)
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" .EEVANGELICAL SEMINARY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
tsS()CIATION INCORPORATED UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE COMPA
NIES ACT)
:ALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 2005
ASSETS
NON-CURRENT ASSETS
Property, plant and equipment














CURRENT ASSETS 4756 137 3881 67
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Cash at Bank 6 323432 529
146
Cash on Hand 50 13








Owing to Designated Funds .
























































































































































Stock - English Text Books
Accounts Rece ivable
Staff Saiary Support Investment








































Sale of Mem orabilia
Sundry Income
Use of facilities and conferences
Unizulu Subsidy received
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Property, Plant and Equipment 2 1,888,473 1,385,896
INVESTMENTS
Spec ific Funds 3 651 ,030 644,750
CURRENT ASSETS 368 ,227 610,529
Stock 57,569 36,825
Accounts Receivable 53,236 34,657
Staff Salary Support Investment 145,881 147,502
Cash at Bank and on Hand 111,541 391,545
TOTAL ASSETS 2,907,730 2,641,175
EQUITY AND LIABILITIES
EQUITY
Accumulated Funds 1,951,862 1,637,807
SPECIFIC FUNDS 4 651,030 644,750
CURRENT LIABILITIES 304,839 358,618
Accounts Payable 114,112 149,200
Staff Salary Support 190,726 209,418
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 2,907,730 2,641,175
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2 523 611 2 539 503
1 884 976 1 888 473
638 635 651 030
374 205 368 227
68 359 57 569
119 543 53 236
186 303 257 422
2 897 816 2 907 730
= ======== ===== ====
EQUITYAND LIABIL ITIES
=========== == =========
EQUITY 2 606 269 2 602 893
Retained ~a rn i ngs 1 967 634 1 951 863
Reserves 6 638 635 651 030
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Accounts payabl e 7 291 547 304 837
---
2 897 816 2 907 730




APPENDIX D - GUIDED INTERVIEW OUTLINE
Which institution are you associated with, and what is your role within the organisation?
Merger Desirability
Do you think a merger would be helpful for your organisation?
What do you know about the other institution - what do you perceive its strengths and
weaknesses to be?
Do you have any concerns about being amalgamated with this institution?
Do you think other stakeholders from your institution would approve of this move?
Merger Feasibility
Do you think a merger is possible? What do you consider the major challenges and obstacles
to overcome?
In your own particular area of expertise, what do you think the major challenges will be?
Do you have any proposals as to how a multi-campus system might work between the two
institutions?
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APPENDIX F - ACADEMIC CURRICULA
UBI: Diploma in Biblical Studies
Bible Introduction














New Testament History I,ll
Doctrine I-Ill
Homiletics I







Greek 11 or Sowers
Church Planting
Christian Home
Bible Culture and Geography
Matthew
Comparative Religion
Library and study skills
Psalms












Additional credits for upgrade to BTh (UniZui)
Advanced Counselling / AIDS Greek I-IV
Contemporary Theological Issues Missions History
Community / Missions sending Crosscultural communication
Literacy skills Creative thinking, work ethic ,
computer
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Evangelical Seminary of Southern Africa
Bachelor of Theology (Ministry and Mission)






























































Study Methods I Practical Communication
Principles of Development
Introduction to Computers





Anthropology and Intercultural Communication
Introduction to Music Ministry
Romans
Introduction to New Testament
Genesis
Introduction to Old Testament
First year fieldwork
Christian Management and Leadership
Aids and the Church
Systematic Theology A
English Skills
Zulu Language and Culture
Course name
Church in Africa








Small Group Leadersh ip
Hermeneutics and Exegesis
Conflict Resolution
Personal Renewal and Stress Management
Christian Education
Preaching










Hosea I Amos I Jonah
Psalms and Wisdom Literature
Third year fieldwork
Pastoral Care
Church Ministry to Family and Home
Areas of Counselling





























































] Choose one course
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APPENDIX G - INFORMED CONSENT FORM
INFORMED CONSENT FORM: MBA THESIS
My name is Michael Bishop (contact telephone number 0333941679) and I am undertaking
this study in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters in Business Administration.
The supervisor of the project is Prof Debbie Vigar-Ellis of the School of Management
(University of KwaZulu-Natal) , who can be contacted on 033 2605899.
The project title is "A feasibility study of a proposed merger between the Evangelical
Seminary of Southern Africa (ESSA) and the Union Bible Institute (UBI)". As an employee of
ESSA and someone who is concerned for the development of theological education in
Southern Africa, I believe that there may be real benefits for both institutions in considering a
merger. This study attempts to ascertain whether or not that belief is well-founded.
You have been asked to complete a questionnaire and/or participate in an interview. While
your contribution will be very helpful to both organizations, you are not obliged to answer any
question put to you. Questionnaires may be submitted on an anonymous basis and I will
personally retain all records relating to any interviews conducted so as to protect the
anonymity of all individuals. Once the thesis is published, these records will be destroyed.
You will not be identified by name in the body of the thesis. You should be able to complete
the questionnaire in no more than ten minutes, while an interview will probably take between
thirty and sixty minutes.
Participation in this study is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any
stage and for any reason.
DECLARAT/ON
/ (ful/ names of participant) hereby
confirm that / understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project,
and / consent to participating in the research project.
/ understand that / am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should / so desire.
S/GNATURE OF PART/C/PANT DATE
Potentia/ subjects should be given time to read, understand and question the information given
before giving consent. This should include time out of the presence of the investigator and
time to consult friends and/or family.
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